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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of l J ra h 
VERN B. MILLARD, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JESSE H. PARRY and ELSIE H. \ 
PARRY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
STRAND ELECTRIC SERVICE COM-
pANY. a corporation, and OTTO 
DREWS, Defendants. 
No. 8026 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiff, Vern B. Millard, appeals from a portion 
of the judgment and decree entered in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, April 23, 195 3 (R. 76-81). 
The action by plaintiff as general contractor was for fore-
closure of a lien filed to secure payment of an alleged unpaid 
balance of $24,752.91, for construction of the Parry Apart-
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ments, which cost $111,073.34 (R. 5, Exhibit P-9). The 
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., trial judge, allowed a total of 
only $92,658.30, on the theory that plaintiff was bound by a 
written contract for $82,000.00 for complete construction 
except for items chargeable as extras, and that plaintiff did 
not rely on the statements of the architect in reducing his 
bid to $82,000.00. The trial court not only gave defendants 
credit for the $87,139.81 paid in the aggregate to plaintiff 
and various materialmen and subcontractors, but the court 
allowed defendants Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry credit 
for two items which the architect and agent for Mr. and Mrs. 
Parry instructed the plaintiff to exclude from the bid, the cost 
of a sewer line in the amount of $1,215.32 not even shown on 
the drawings, and the difference of $400.00 in cost of brick. 
By stipulation entered into after the trial to enable de-
fendants Parry to "stop the running of interest," said defend-
ants paid $1,963.48 to defendants Strand Electric Service Com-
pany, including $134.25 interest and $39.20 attorney fees and 
costs to satisfy said lien claimant; $436.86 to defendant Otto 
Drews including $3.S.36 interest and costs; and $1,938.13 to 
John Lee Floor Coverings for materials and work, including 
$161.77 interest and $14.20 costs (R. 54-55). The court then 
credited those payments, including all of the interest and costs 
except $42.75 against the principal amount which the court 
found to have been due and owing from defendants Parry to 
plaintiff, but denied plaintiff any interest on the amount found 
due from the Parrys although no payment was made until 
after the trial, so that plaintiff was charged with both interest 
and costs on indebtedness found due and owing from the 
4 
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Parrys for construction, to arrive at a net balance of $435.30 
in favor of Jesse H. Parry against the plaintiff (R. 74-75). 
The trial court also assessed costs against the plaintiff, and 
denied plaintiff all costs and attorney fees, although the court 
charged plaintiff with the costs and attorney fees of other 
lien claimants who were not paid by reason of the failure 
of defendants Parry to pay. 
The portions of the judgment and decree appealed from 
on May 22, 1953, (R. 80-81) relate to: (a) Denial of recovery 
by plaintiff of $18,414.04 in costs of construction resulting 
from the acts, omissions and conduct of Jesse H. Parry and 
Elsie H. Parry as owners, and their architect. (b) Allowance 
of credit to defendant Jesse H. Parry in the amount of $1,215.32 
for construction of sewer, and $400.00 for savings in cost 
of brick, notwithstanding the architect for said defendants who 
controlled the bidding directed the plaintiff to exclude those 
items in preparation of bids. (c) Disallowance of items of 
!~ cost in excess of the amounts the architect instructed plaintiff 
to allow, such as allowance for heating; and disallowance of 
costs where architect instructed plaintiff not to figure any 
-... costs. (d) Denial of recovery against defendants Parry for 
~1 lien costs, attorney fees and interest. (e) Charging plaintiff 
I~ the interest, costs and attorney fees paid by defendants to lien 
~ claimants after trial, which items were incurred by reason 
r;: of the wilful failure of defendants Parry to pay when demand 
~ was made for payment December 28, 1951, and defendants 
S!l Parry were authorized to pay either jointly to subcontractors, 
~ and plaintiff or directly to subcontractors. (f) Denial to plain-
0 c tiffs of his costs, notwithstanding defendants Parry refused to 
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pay event the amount the court found to be owing to them until 
after the trial. (g) The provisions of the decree ordering plain-
tiff to release the lien, when plaintiff was only partially paid. 
Plaintiff does not appeal from the portion of the judgment 
which dismisses the counterclaim of defendant Jesse H. Parry, 
but plaintiff appeals from inconsistent provisions of the judg-
ment, in addition to portions of the judgment relating to 
items hereinabove enumerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) Events prior to signing of contract. 
Defendant and respondent Jesse H. Parry is a restaurant 
operator (R. 606). He and his wife, Elsie H. Parry, were and 
are the owners of real estate at 160 South 13th East in Salt 
Lake City, on which there was situated an apartment house. 
Said defendants also owned another apartment house on 
adjoining property to the south (R. 606). By telephone ap-
pointment Mr. Parry met the plaintiff and appellant, Vern 
B. Millard, on the property during the first part of November, 
1950. Mr. Millard was and is a general contractor. At the 
time Mr. Parry met him, Mr. Parry had some plans which 
he had procured from Hyland Lumber Company similar to 
plans of a building being constructed by Mr. Millard for 
Mr. and Mrs. Flandro at Fourth Avenue and C Street (Ex-
hibit 34). Mr. Parry wanted to build an apartment house to 
the rear of the existing structure at 160 South 13th East Street. 
Mr. Millard told Mr. Parry that those plans were not suitable 
for the construction site, and Mr. Millard suggested that Mr. 
Parry consult an architect (R. 607-608). 
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11 
About December 1, 1950, Mr. Parry employed Mr. LeRoy 
\'\'. Johnson as his architect (R. 609, 721). Exhibit 35 is a 
site plan prepared by the architect for an 11 unit apartment 
at the rear of said tract of land, dated December 2, 1950 (R. 
609). They discussed various apartment houses, including 
the Lindsay apartments, which were then being constructed 
by Mr. Millard at a cost of $78,500.00 (R. 392-393, 724-726). 
The yellow sheets of Exhibit D-1 7 were the cost figures worked 
out between Mr. Parry and the architect on December 14, 
1950; but the white sheet, (which shows the architects's esti-
mate of $81,879.00, without any allowance for taxes, insur-
ance, or any overhead costs of the general contractor or 
any allowance for the services of the general contractor) , 
was presented to Mr. Parry by the architect sometime before 
the contract was signed (R. 736-738). 
During a period of two or three weeks after Mr. Parry 
hired the architect, he said he had no discussion with Mr. 
Millard (R. 722). Mr. Parry had a discussion with Mr. Millard 
about what could be done to improve the appearance of 
the existing structure at 160 South 13th East Street. 1vfr. 
Millard told him he thought it would be more economical 
to build a new structure in front, rather than to remodel the 
old building, in addition to building an apartment house in 
the rear. Mr. Parry then entered into discussion with Mr. 
Johnson, his architect, about building a 6 unit apartment in 
front of the old structure. Mr. Parry said he did not have 
sufficient finances without mortgaging the front property, and 
that he had cash resources of about $59,000.00 (R. 724-726). 
Before there was any request to bid, Mr. and Mrs. Parry 
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had a discussion with their architect in December, 1950, 
about having certain items taken care of in advance, including 
windows, fixtures, refrigerators and ranges. Mr. Parry said 
he wanted materials as far as possible, at their finger tips 
before signing a contract (R. 722). At that time he expressed 
the fear that due to the Korean war, there was a possibility 
that the government might curtail or stop the type of con-
struction contemplated, and Mr. Parry felt it would be ad-
visable to purchase items which might become critical or be-
come impossible to obtain, as he was afraid there would be 
a government freeze order (R. 398, 722). The Pella windows 
were decided on long before there was any contract (R. 733). 
~ '1'1' 
, ...... J 
Mr. and Mrs. Parry went to Ludlow Plumbing Company J: 
late in December or early in January to select types of fixtures 
and colors for bathrooms. They had no discussion with Mr. 
Millard about it (R. 723, 738-739). Mr. Johnson, the archi-
tect, testified that Exhibit P-4, a bid on plumbing from Grant 
E. Barnes, addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Parry dated January 
8, 1951, was obtained by him for the Parrys. Said bid ex-
press! y states: "This does not include sewer or water meter 
service." The said bid was in the amount of $5,567.07 (R. 
336-33 7). With respect to said plumbing bid, the same was 
incorporated into the architects's estimate of costs, part of 
Exhibit 17, prior to the date the contract was signed on Jan-
uary 29, 1951, "Plumbing complete. Bid by Barns & Chase 
$5567.00." Mr. Parry testified that he did not remember Mr. !]:, 
Johnson telling him that he had obtained a proposal from :L; 
Grant E. Barnes; but that Mr. Johnson "suggested that he 
had talked to a man by the name of Barnes, and that the 
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::' fixtures would be bought through the Ludlow Plumbing 
!lit: through Mr. Barnes and we would have to select colors and 
"i. that is the first time we ever seen Mr. Barnes" (R. 617-618). 
~~ :Mr. and :Mrs. Parry went to the Ludlow Plumbing Company 
~ about the middle of January to pick out types and colors of 
~ .fixtures, and they met Mr. Barnes there, the man that was 
li~ going to do the plumbing (R. 758-759). Ranges, refrigera-
:l; tors, and windows were also purchased by Mr. and Mrs. 
~l: Parry. Thtts_. before there was any request for bids, the owners 
iCI:i:' were procuring materials and fixtures for the construction 
rrr job, items usually purchased by the general contractor. 11r. 
Millard had nothing to do with the ordering of windows, 
plumbing fixtures, ranges, refrigerators (R. 396-397). Mrs. 
Elsie H. Parry testified that it was around the first part of 
January 1951 when she and her husband went to Ludlow 
Plumbing Company to select types and colors of fixtures, and 
-, also when they selected ranges, refrigerators, etc. (R. 785-786). 
-r-
--~ 
~,:_ 
Mr. Parry testified that he hired the architect for his skill 
and know-how with respect to the type of equipment and 
other things which should go into the construction project, 
and that Mr. Johnson was hired to take care of the details of 
the job (R. 732). Mr. Parry said he told Mr. Johnson that 
it was up to Mr. Johnson to work out these problems for him 
(R. 733). Mr. Parry also said he had given Mr. Johnson a 
big retainer, and that Mr. Johnson was working for him (R. 
613--614). On various matters he said he told Mr. Johnson 
that he would leave certain matters to his judgment (R. 733). 
He said he wanted to be sure that the heating systems would 
be adequate, and that working out the heating arrangement 
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was left to the architect, as that is what he was hired for 
(R. 732, 744). Mr. Parry also testified that he expected Mr. 
Millard to deal with the architect (R. 770) . 
Mr. Miles E. Miller, architect called to testify for de-
fendants, testified that the architect gives the instructions as 
to how to bid, and that contractors are supposed to follow the 
directions of the architect in bidding. He further testified 
that the plaintiff, Mr. Millard, has always followed the in-
structions of the architect, in his experience (R. 853-855, 861) . 
. Mr. Arthur D. Taylor, a building expediter, called as a witness 
for defendants, testified that the architect governs the bidding 
(R. 905), and in the specifications submitted to contractors 
there is generally a sheet relating to instructions to bidders 
( R. 904) . Such a sheet was not embodied in the documents 
of this case (R. 905). 
When Mr. Parry obtained a copy of plans and specifica-
tions on the 11 unit apartments in January 1951, he tried 
to get a figure from Ellis Barker, but he was too busy (R. 766). 
When he received them he was not aware that sheets 37, 38 
and 39 had been deleted from the specifications (R. 739-740). 
Mr. Vern B. Millard, the plaintiff, was presented with 
a set of plans and specifications about January 20, 1951, 
Exhibits P-2 and P-3. Mr. Johnson, the architect, said he 
would have to furnish details later as the plans were incom-
plete because of lack of time, as the Parrys were anxious to 
go ahead, and time was very important to them. He said also 
that the Parrys had ordered ranges, refrigerators, and . win-
dows, and that the Parrys wanted to engage the men they 
10 
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had contracted with, particularly the plumber. He further 
stated that the specifications covered the over-all picture 
(R. 137-140). The architect testified that he explained to 
Mr. and Mrs. Parry that the plans were relatively incomplete, 
but the Parrys were fearful of a government freeze order 
which would adversely affect this type of construction, so 
they proceeded on plans and specifications which had not 
been in a final sense coordinated. Mr. Johnson said he told 
Mr. Millard that the first contract was to cover the 11 unit 
apartments, and other portions of the project including a 
6 unit structure to the east, as well as sewer and water lines, 
would come under a later contract. Exhibit P-16, the master 
plot plan which defendants produced upon demand, shows 
the sewer system from a point 5 feet outside the house out 
to the street, as a part of construction project No. 2. Mr. 
Johnson said he instructed Mr. Millard to figure on stubbing 
both sewer and water lines 5 feet outside the building, as 
both systems would be included in the second or 6 unit 
project. Mr. 11illard was instructed to prepare his bid on 
that basis. He was also told to allow $7,800 to $8,000 for 
heating, as the system had not been completely worked out 
(R. 337-339). Mr. Millard was also told by the architect 
that the Pella window unit, with which Mr. Millard was un-
familiar, would be installed by the brick mas<?ns, and that 
i:: he should not figure any carpenter labor for such installations 
itl1 (R. 141-148). When Mr. Millard asked whether the masonry 
~ walls should continue 13 inches in thickness to the roof, Mr. 
iJ; Johnson told him not to figure walls 13 inches at the top floor, 
j ~ as that was not necessary, and would take space from the 
1 ~ apartment (R. 343). Mr. Millard excluded from his bid the 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
items the architect told him to delete, and nothing was allowed 
in his figures for anything the architect told him to omit 
(R. 148-149). Mr. Millard first submitted a bid for $90,000.00 
(R. 141). 
When plaintiff submitted his bid, the architect showed 
him Exhibit P-4, which is the plumbing bid dated January 8, 
1951, addressed to defendants Parry, for $5,567.07, which 
specifies: ·'This does not include sewer or water meter serv-
ice." Mr. Johnson told Mr. Millard that "This is a legitimate 
bid. I know this plumber. You can use it in your bid." In 
going over the items as to what should be excluded, Mr. 
:Millard then submitted a bid for $85,212.00 (R. 142). He 
relied on the items which Mr. Johnson told him to use in his 
figures, including the plumbing bid, heating, windows, brick 
work, and fixtures. Mr. Johnson told Mr. Millard that the 
Parrys were going ahead with the 6 unit apartment and 
would spend $45,000.00 and Mr. Parry asked Mr. Millard 
to figure costs to include that price. Mr. Johnson, the archi-
tect, said that Mr. Parry would go ahead with both if Mr. 
Millard would reduce his bid on the 11 unit structure to 
$82,000.00 (R. 142-143, 146-152}. Mr. Millard was told 
that by building both together there would be more efficient 
operation with men and equipment working so close together. 
That is why Mr. Millard reduced his figure to $82,000.00. 
When Exhibit P-6, the contract, was presented for signa-
ture, Mr. Millard asked who would supervise the job. Mr. 
Johnson assured him that he would supervise and that no 
one else would be permitted to interfere in any respect, and 
that the owners would not have anything to do with super-
12 
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vision. Mr. Millard asked whether there would be any undue 
interference by the owners at the job site, as Mr. and Mrs. 
Parry were operating two existing apartment houses, and he 
asked if his workmen would be free to proceed with work 
by looking directly to the architect for instructions and any 
clarifications of drawings and specifications. This was im-
portant to Mr. Millard because when an owner comes on a 
job and talks to his men, or makes changes, or interferes 
in any way, it slows down the job and makes it more costly. 
Mr. Millard relied also on the assurances that the architect 
would be the supervisor, in signing the contract (R. 154-155, 
344) . There was no contradiction of the testimony of plaintiff 
that it is more economical for a contractor to have supervision 
of construction by an architect. Also, Mr. Miles E. Miller, 
witness for defendant, testified that when an architect becomes 
the supervisor, he is supposed to be impartial (R. 853). 
Before the contract, Exhibits P-6 and D-7, were signed, 
dated January 29, 1951, there was a discussion at the office 
of the architect between the architect, Mr. Millard and Mr. 
Parry. Mr. Parry told Mr. Johnson to go ahead with the plans 
for the 6 unit apartments, and said Mr. Millard would build 
them in conjunction with the 11 unit apartments. He said 
he would spend $45,000.00 for the 6 unit apartments, and 
asked Mr. Millard to figure costs to include that price. Mr. 
Parry stated that Mr. Millard should make money on the 
project, and by building both together there would be an 
efficient operation (R. 142-143-, 146-152). Mr. Millard testi-
fied that he relied on the statements of both Mr. Parry and 
his architect in signing the contract. 
13 
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(b) Events from date of signing contract to date of 
termination of services of the architect as supervisor. 
Mr. Millard started construction of the 11 unit apart-
ments on February 5, 1951. The architect went ahead with 
plans for the 6 unit apartment, Exhibit P-10. There was no 
delay in preparation of the plans in February, 1951. Mr. 
Parry said he did not have sufficient finances without mortgag-
ing the front property (R. 725). The architect testified that 
some time in April Mr. Parry said the bank wanted a mortgage 
on the entire property, and he wanted to mortgage only the 
front of it, so he said he would make other financial arrange-
ments. He said Mr. Millard could still count on proceeding 
,--..rith the 6 unit structure, but in the latter part of the same 
month he said he would have to hold off indefinitely the con-
struction of the front unit, and he did not intend that Mr. 
Millard would be injured financially by the delay (R. 335-336). 
Mr. Parry also testified that he told Mr. Millard and 
Mr. Johnson that he could not finance construction of the 6 
unit apartment in front, without mortgaging it; and he told 
them he thought he could mortgage the front and leave the 
back portion of the property out of the mortgage (R. 725). 
While he testified that he was unable to make any financial 
arrangements to go ahead with the 6 unit apartment, and 
that he so notified Mr. Johnson in ,January 1951 (R. 764), 
he admitted that it was not inability to mortgage the property, 
but the fact that the bank wanted a mortgage on the entire 
property which he did not want to give, and that he said he 
would go elsewhere for the finance (R. 734) . 
Mr. Parry further testified that a newspaper reporter 
14 
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came to him to get a cut which appeared in the Salt Lake 
Tribune, Sunday, February 18, 1951, (Exhibit P-21). He 
said that Mr. Johnson wanted that put in the paper (R. 735-
736, 764). He admitted that he had the article in his possession 
since February 18, 1951. The article states: "Plans for $125,-
000 in apartment construction ... were announced Saturday 
by Jesse H. Parry ... Plans are to add to the rear of the 
existing building a structure containing 11 two-bedroom units 
and another at the front housing six bachelor apartments. 
Both of the new additions will be three stores and of golden 
buff brick . . . Vern B. Millard has the contract. The front 
addition is to be started this summer and completed before 
winter. The rear unit ... will cost approximately $85,000. 
The front portion will cost $40,000." 
l',rr. Parry also testified that "The only mistake I made, 
I didn't notify Mr. Johnson by letter to discontinue. He just 
continued on with his services which we offered to pay him 
at one time $1,000.00 if he would quit his services and he 
wouldn't consider it for what he had done" (R. 763-764). 
Ivfr. :Millard testified that it was about March, 1951 when 
Mr. Parry refused to go ahead with the 6 unit apartments 
because he was unwilling to mortgage the entire property (R. 
188-189). 
The electrical plans were not followed, but changed (R. 
339). The heating system was also changed from the heat-
pump system to a hot water boiler with individual heat coils 
and blowers for each individual apartment, which was ap-
proved by Mr. and Mrs. Parry. Mr. Millard had nothing to 
do with the selection of D. A. Olson & Company as heating 
15 
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contractor. The architect handed to Mr. Millard the proposal 
from said company some weeks after the contract had been 
signed, and told Mr. Millard to go ahead with such proposal 
(R. 339-341). Mr. Parry said he did not notice the substi-
tution of sheets in the specifications on heating (R. 740), 
and that he did not see the heating contract before Mr. Johnson 
told Mr. Millard to sign it (R. 743.). Mr. Parry further stated 
that he left those matters to the architect and that was why 
he was hired (R. 744). The heating plans were not com-
pleted until some time after the job started (R. 732, 744). 
The work progressed satisfactorily in February and March 
1951. Then defendants Parry ordered the brick masons to in-
stall some ventilators which they had purchased (R. 156). 
At first said defendants came onto the job every two or three 
days, then one of them was there every day (R. 157-160). 
Mr. Parry admitted that he came onto the job practically every 
day (R. 718). His wife was there also on a number of occa-
sions. Mr. and Mrs. Parry had disagreements with each other 
at the job, opposing each other as to what changes were to 
be made (R. 160-161, 345-347). Mr. Parry admitted that 
he and his wife had controversies with each other as to how 
they wanted things done on the job and that they each talked 
to Mr. Merrill, construction foreman, about it (R. 719). Mr. 
Parry also said he had some disputes with the architect (R. 
715) , and some heated discussions before the services of 
the architect were terminated (R. 717). 
There were inconsistencies and defects in the plans, dis-
covered after the job started. Mr. Parry testified to numerous 
changes, some of which were due to mistakes of the architect, 
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J ... 
the walls not being the right measurements for the cabinets, 
windows, and other items of construction (R. 660, 705, 708). 
Also the heating plans were not completed until some time 
after the job started (R. 732, 744). 
The Parrys began to find fault with the architect and to 
give their own instructions. When they talked to employees 
the men did no work (R. 157-159). Mr. Millard made com-
plaints to the architect about the interference of the Parrys. 
Mr. Millard claimed his men were losing too much time on 
the job as a result. Mr. Johnson, the architect, requested the 
Parrys to deal with him, and not talk to workmen or sub-
contractors, as it was resulting in a chaotic condition on the 
job. During the latter part of June or the first part of July 
Mr. Millard complained both to the architect and to the 
Parrys that their interference was costing money. It was finally 
a question ·whether the architect or Mr. Parry would supervise 
the job. 11r. Parry said he did not want Mr. Millard to feel 
that he would lose money on the project and that he would 
see to it that Mr. Millard was taken care of, but that they 
(the Parrys) wanted the structure built the way they wanted 
it, and that it was their money that was going into these items. 
Finally on July 19, 1951, Mr. Parry told the architect he no 
longer wanted his services on that job (R. 345-348). 
Before the services of the architect were terminated, 
Miles E. Miller, witness for defendants, overheard Mr. John-
son say that the job would progress better if Mrs. Parry were 
not there (R. 848). Mr. Miller also testified that the plans 
in this case were not prepared in accordance with good prac-
tice (R. 861). 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although Mr. Parry by way of conclusion said he did not 
interfere, he admitted that he had heated controversies with 
the achitect, particularly over changes in the heating lay-out 
(R. 716-717). Mr. Parry also said he had the right to make 
changes and that he did make changes, and he said he was 
willing to pay for them, too (R. 768, 771). However, he 
contesetd payment on practically every item of any conse-
quence, including the changes necessitated in the heating ar-
rangements, although he finally approved the architect's di-
rections with respect thereto (R. 768-769). 
Mr. Parry also testified that he had no controversies with 
either Mr. Millard or his foreman, Mr. Merrill. He testified 
that both were nice on the job, and both did what they were 
asked to do. As Mr. Millard went ahead he was very nice 
(R. 747). Mr. Merrill, construction foreman, never refused 
to do anything Mr. Parry asked him to do (R. 715). When 
he asked Mr. Millard why things were done in a certain way, 
Mr. Millard said he was following the instructions of the 
architect. Mr. Parry said he asked for things to be done and 
Mr. Millard and his foreman were willing to do anything 
they asked, as he told them he had the money to pay for it 
and he wanted things done the way he wanted as that was 
what he was paying for (R. 747). He testified to errors in 
the plans (R. 660, 705-706), and as to changes made in 
cabinets because of discrepancies in measurements his wife 
took care of that detail (~. 705-706) . 
Mr. Parry also testified that he expected Mr. Millard to 
deal with the architect (R. 771). The architect testified that 
Mr. Millard did not refuse to follow any instructions, and he 
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I: 
had no difficulty with either Mr. Millard or his construction 
foreman (R. 345). The architect was generally at the job 
site every day in person or by a representative, and he had 
three or four telephone conversations each week with Mr. 
Millard prior to the termination of his services. Mr. and 
Mrs. Parry generally appeared on the job after Mr. Johnson 
left, and talked to persons in his absence, and numerous com-
planits arose over interference by the owners which he tried 
to settle by conferences with the Parrys (R. 345-347). 
The controversy between the Parrys and the architect 
which led up to the termination of his services arose over the 
changes in the heating arrangements and system. The architect 
had ordered Mr. Millard to fur down for airducts on the 
second floor, according to the version of Mr. Parry, and 
Mr. and Mrs. Parry objected to such change and said they 
would not allow it and stopped the work (R. 699, 701, 789). 
The heating plans were not completed until some time after 
the job was started, and the floor joists were laid according 
to plan, but that arrangement did not allow for running 
some of the ducts between the joists. It became necessary to 
build ducts over kitchen cabinets, and under ceiling joists 
and to lower the kitchen and hall ceilings (R. 699-701). 
Finally, after Mr. Parry visited the Lindsay apartments, he 
said that was the only way it could be done and after two 
days told the men to go ahead (R. 157-160, 699-701). That 
incident resulted in severing relations with the architect by 
Mr. Parry (R. 701). Termination of the services of the archi-
tect occurred on July 19, 1951 (R. 347-348, 701). 
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( c} Changes and incidents from and after date of termi-
nation of services of the architect by Mr. Parry. 
A considerable amount of the changes which occurred 
overlappcJ in the two periods. The testimony of Mr. Parry 
is to the effect that he complained about numerous items on 
the job (R. 695-706, 710, 719). They were items which re-
lated to errors of the architect, the walls not being the right 
measurements for the cabinets, windows, and other details 
(R. 660, 705, 708). Mr. Parry admitted that he authorized 
many extras (R. 632). But he refused to sign for extras (R. 
691 ) . He also expressed the opinion that the changes which 
'':ere ordered did not require as much work as Mr. Millard 
claimed, although he did not stay around to see what work 
was done or how long it took (R. 773). He said his wife is 
very clever with decorating and has a lot farther sight than 
he has, and they had disagreements as to changes to be made, 
and they talked to Mr. Merrill about it (R. 719). He testified 
that he wanted to pay Mr. Millard everything he asked him 
to do for him (R. 768). With respect to certain items, such 
as whether additional cabinets could be used because of the 
discrepancies in measurements in the plans, he testified that 
his wife took care of such detail (R. 706-707). 
With respect to the conversation which occurred between 
Mr. Parry and Mr. Millard following termination of the serv-
ices of the architect by Mr. Parry, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Parry did not employ a new architect. According Jo Mr. 
Millard, Mr. Parry came to the job site and said he had fired 
the architect, and that he would supervise the job· himself, 
and that he would make sure that Mr. Millard would be paid 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n: 
~--
,J; .. 
;. .. --
his contractor's percentage if he would continue on the job. 
Mr. Parry instructed him to go ahead and make various changes 
(R. 159-160). Mr. Parry also told him to keep a record of 
all costs on the job, and such statement was furnished October 
30, 1951, Exhibit P-8 (R. 161). 
There is no dispute as to the fact that Mr. Parry said 
he was going to supervise in place of the architect. Mr. Parry 
testified that he figured that his experience qualified him 
to supervise the construction, and that his money would 
carry him through (R. 773.). His experience was very limited, 
although h esaid he had no training in engineering, he had 
remodeled an apartment, built a home and two restaurants. 
He did not testify that he had ever had any experience super-
visiting construction, his business being a restaurant business. 
There was no testimony to refute the evidence that super-
vision by the owner is more costly to the contractor. Mr. 
Parry said that l\1r. Millard told him he would have nothing 
but a shell, and that they could work together to get the 
building completed (R. 623). At that time Mr. Parry said 
he had paid Mr. lviillard up to the contract price and was 
withholding 10% and that he told Mr. Millard he would pay 
him the 10% he had been withholding (R. 624). Mr. Parry 
did not testify that Mr. Millard consented to such a proposal. 
Furthermore, the documents, particularly Exhibit P-13, shows 
that Mr. Millard at that time had not been paid up to the 
contract price, and Mr. Parry did not pay the 10% being 
withheld. His subsequent testimony that Mr. Millard billed 
him on that basis is contrary to the documents which show 
that Mr. Millard billed on a basis of cost plus 10% (Ex-
hibit P-13). 
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Mrs. Elsie H. Parry testified that Mr. Parry said to Mr. 
Millard: "If you continue on with the building, we will pay 
you the contract price and also give you your ten per cent" 
(R. 791). Upon leading questions from counsel for defendants 
she testified by way of conclusion that extras were to be billed 
as separate items on a basis of cost plus 10% (R. 791). Neither 
of the defendants testified to any statement which would con-
stitute an acceptance of a proposal which the Parrys construe 
to mean a waiver of the right to supervision by the architect 
nor any willingness of the contractor to assume the additional 
costs incident to further owner supervision. Payments were 
not made on the basis testified to by Mr. Parry, as illustrated 
by Exhibit P-13, but the billings were computed on a basis of 
cost plus 10% to the contractor, although the Parrys did not 
always pay the full amount. 
Mr. Clarence L. Merrill, a general contractor, who was 
construction foreman on the Parry job, testified in detail as 
to numerous inconsistencies in the plans, as to incompleteness 
of plans, numerous changes in construction both before and 
after July 19, 1951, and also as to interference with the work 
by Mr. and Mrs. Parry, which ran construction costs to more 
than $111,000.00 (R. 201-328). He testified that the red 
pencil markings on the plans, Exhibit P-2, indicate the changes 
made in construction and also the alterations (R. 203-204). 
He conferred with the architect almost daily by reason of 
being foreman on the job. The architect told him they were 
not to follow either the heating or the electrical plans as they 
were to be changed (R. 207). Dispute arose between the 
architect and the Parrys. The architect ordered changes, which 
included sliding doors in closets. Then Mr. Merrill noticed 
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that the windows which came on the job would not fit, and 
they would not be in line with the basement windows, so it 
became necessary to fur in the outside walls to create enough 
room for a tile sill on the inside windows, which the architect 
ordered. Each window had to be furred in, and pulled in 
flush to the inside of the wall. Then other discrepancies were 
noticed in the plans. It was observed that there was not suffi-
cient clearance between the cabinets, so it was necessary to 
extend the living room wall section a foot. Different apart-
ments had different problems, which required changes (R. 
210-213). 
It was discovered that there were no electrical outlets pro-
vided for the heating unit for the pumps and blowers, and it 
became necessary to go over all of those items. The entire 
lighting system had to be changed from low voltage system 
to a standard system (R. 214-215). Cabinets of different 
sizes and additional cabinets were installed, and different sinks 
were installed because of the space problem (R. 215). 
Before Mr. Johnson left the job as architect, the whole 
heating system was changed. The first information as to a new 
heating set-up was after the walls were in place, some of the 
partitions finished and it became necessary to remodel the 
closets to receive the heating units, as they had not been planned 
large enough. It required a lot of work and materials to 
change them. It was likewise necessary to fur down all of 
the ceiling areas in the hallways to provide the heating plan 
for the apartments. It was necessary to· devise plans to run 
the heating through furring down and through the top of 
kitchen cabinets, and also to change a number of door head-
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ings, to open them up to run vents in through the doors. The 
sketches on the heating system did not come from D. A. Olson 
Company until that stage of the work was reached. The archi-
tect instructed the witness to proceed in accordance with the 
Olson heating layout. Mr. and Mrs. Parry said they did not 
want that and would not stand for anything like that, and 
had the men called off, then two days later the witness was 
told to go ahead (R. 216-218). Then Mr. Olson said the 
cold-air ducts were not part of his contract, so Mr. Millard's 
men had to dig the trenches in the basement for forming of 
the cement for the pipes. Some vents in the bathroom and 
laundry rooms are ordinarily taken care of by the sheet metal 
men, but D. A. Olson Company charged all of those items 
as extras (R. 219). 
On the paneling, a change from corrugated transite to 
combed plywood was made, with extra framing, not only on 
the new apartments, but also on the old apartment house. 
Other work was done in the old apartment house at the di-
rection of Mr. Parry. It took a lot of time to install the win-
dows which were supposed to be of a character that the brick 
masons could just set them in. They came as a packaged unit, 
and did not arrive until the job was well along (R. 220-22). 
Changes had to be made because of variation in sizes of open-
ings in relation to sizes of refrigerators. The Parrys requested 
drawers to be put in the back of the island or fence of the 
dinette area to give an appearance of finish. There are about 
three in each of the 11 apartments (R. 23:-224). An extra four-
inch chase was run in the brick partition. A set of stairs was 
ordered by Mr. Parry, and after it was built he ordered it 
removed a day or two later. There were extra window wells. 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There was some extra fencing, patios, and additions and 
changes in the sidewalk arrangement; also additional blacktop, 
and a retaining wall at the west end of the apartment house. 
Neither the plumber nor the heating people would hook up 
the hot water, so Mr. Millard had it done. The heating people 
did not figure on excavation for the oil tank. The witness did 
not keep on charging as extras for all of the additional work 
as Mr. Millard told him the cost of the building was out of 
proportion. Some discussions were had with the Parrys about 
the costs being way over what had been anticipated. The job 
was unusual in that the architect was released and the owner 
took over supervision of the job and there were more changes 
than usual. The owners had numerous conversations with 
witness and took up a good portion of his time on the job (R. 
224-227). 
There were many contradictions in the plans. They were 
not complete as to detail (R. 228) . With unusual changes on 
the job, it becomes increasingly difficult to account for all of 
the costs and expenses as extras. It took time to change cabi-
nets and sinks. In taking out the cabinets and replacing them, 
a man would lose at least a couple of days, at $20 per day. 
Mr. Merrill, a general contractor now, has had substan-
tial experience in figuring jobs. He testified that overhead ex-
pense includes workmen's compensation, social security and 
unemployment compensation, which amounts to about 10% 
(R. 232). 
Mr. Merrill detailed the costs and expenses to Mr. Millard 
if the various items of changes and delays in operations were 
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charged as extras. For convenience they were listed and intro-
duced in evidence as Exhibit P-14 (R. 251). He gave the rea-
sonable cost value of those items R. 251-328). He testified, 
with respect to supervision of construction, that "It is a lot 
cheaper to deal with an architect than it is with the owner be-
cause the architect understands more of construction". (R. 
228). It took longer to build because of the separation of the 
architect (R. 289). There were about 3.()0 hours of overtime, 
besides the excessive costs from owner interference (R. 288). 
After the first two or three~ months the Parrys came every 
day. They discussed the building and methods, things being 
done and changes. They asked why certain things were being 
done. They did not like some of the men. They talked to the 
men some. They engaged in arguments between themselves. 
The additional labor which would not have been incurred 
if the architect had been supervising the job would amount 
to $200.00 for each apartment, or a total of $2,200.00 (R. 
256-257). 
Mr. Merrill testified that if the apartment house had been 
planned the way it was built, the reasonable cost of construc-
tion in 1951 when built, would have been $10,000 per unit, 
except for the three larger units and $12,000 per unit for 
the larger units, which would amount to $116,000.00 (R. 257). 
A structure similar to the Parry Apartments is the Lindsay 
Apartment building, except that there are about 1200 feet 
more of floor space in the Parry Apartments, which cost from 
$9,600 to $10,800 more than the $78,500.00 cost of the Lind-
say Apartments (R. 392-393). In addition thereto, the Parry 
Apartments have features not found in the Lindsay Apart- · 
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ments. There are no special windows, but only aluminum 
casement sash in the Lindsay Apartments. The special win-
dows would cost about three times the amount of the sash in 
the Lindsay Apartment house. There all are wooden cabinets 
in the Lindsay Apartments, no planter boxes nor other special 
items in theLindsay Apartments, just the bare essentials (R. 
393-394). Mr. Parry suggested that the location of the Parry 
Apartments would dema~d and justify a building of a more 
superior character and of better finish. Those were the items 
of extras or items added to the Parry job, especially after 
the architect left the job (R. 394). 
The sewer was not shown on the plans Exhibit P-2, nor 
on the master plot plan completed in April, Exhibit 16, to be 
a part of the construction project for the 11 unit apartments. 
:Mr. Parry made his own contract with Mr. Chase for the 
installation of the sewer (R. 694). The sewer was not in accord-
ance with the master plot plan (R. 762-763). He had a dis-
cussion with the architect as to where the line should run, 
between the buildings down the driveway. Cast iron pipe 
was used instead of soil pipe. 
Mr. Millard obtained the lien waivers as requested, when 
payments were made (R. 776). Mr. Parry said he could not 
do anything with Mr. Millard on billing, and said he told 
Mr. Millard if he could furnish a list of people that had 
not been paid they would try and pay them, and they would 
try to settle this in the best manner they possibly could (R. 
629). Mr. Parry then verified the various claims of subcon-
tractors and materialmen (R. 630). Mr. Millard gave Mr. 
Parry a statement as to total costs incurred to October 30, 1951, 
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Exhibit P-8 (R. 632). The Parrys received the letter from 
counsel for plaintiff dated December 28, 1951, together with 
a revised complete statement as to costs, Exhibit P-9 (R. 797). 
Thereafter Mr. and Mrs. Parry made payments to Johnson 
Supply Company, but made payments to neither Mr. Millard 
nor to subcontractors and materialmen. Mr. Millard filed a 
lien for a balance of $24,752.91, January 8, 1952, Exhibit 
P-41. 
(d) Dismissal as to other claimants. 
The court consolidated with this case for purposes of 
trial, the case of John Lee Balmforth and Erma Balmforth, 
co-partners, doing business as John Lee Floor Coverings, Plain-
tiffs, vs. Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry, Defendants, No. 
96, 104. Plaintiff herein was brought in as a third party 
defendant. The amounts owing to John Lee Floor Coverings, 
Strand Electric Service Company, and Otto Drews, defendant 
subcontractor and materialmen, were established by stipula-
tion (R. 94-122). Payment was made by the defendants 
Parry one week after trial, to stop the running of interest, 
and the complaints, counterclaim and cross-complaints of those 
three claimants were dismissed with prejudice (R. 54-57). 
Those claimants are not parties to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE POINTS UPON WHICH AP-
PELLANT RELIES FOR REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
OR MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT. 
1. The judgment and decree contains contradictory pro-
visions, and dismissal of the counterclaim precluded entry of 
a judgment against the plaintiff. 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The order requiring plaintiff to release his lien was con-
trary to law. 
3. The trial court unlawfully penalized plaintiff for the 
defaults of defendants Parry by denying plaintiff interest 
on sums found to be due and owing from said defendants, and 
by allowing said defendants interest paid to third party obli-
gees after trial. 
4. It was error to allow the defaulting attorney fees and 
costs, and also error to deny the plaintiff attorney fees and 
costs. 
5. Plaintiff reduced his bid to $82,000 in reliance on the 
direction of the architect for omissions of certain items, and 
also on the promise of architect supervision and non-inter-
ference by owners, and on the representation that additional 
cons traction \Yas being awarded to plaintiff; so that plaintiff 
was not bound when defendants disregarded the contract and 
deprived plaintiff of a substantial portion of the consideration 
for which he bargained. 
6. Even if the contract were not voidable, it could not 
be construed to require plaintiff to furnish items in excess of 
those on which the architect as agent of owners instructed 
plaintiff to base his bid, and plaintiff is entitled to recover 
additional sums. 
7. The purported agreement which the court found was 
made on July 19, 1951, is contrary to the evidence, and would 
deprive plaintiff of thousands of dollars without consideration. 
8. Failure of the trial court to allow even as extras, thou-
sands of dollars of costs incurred by plaintiff by the conduct 
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of defendants and their architect, amounts to unjust enrich-
ment of said defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE CONTAINS CON-
TRADICTORY PROVISIONS, AND DISMISSAL OF THE 
COUNTERCLAIM PRECLUDED ENTRY OF A JUDG-
MENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff appealed from those portions of the judg-
ment and decree which are adverse to plaintiff. The portions 
of the judgment, hereinafter quoted, from which plaintiff has 
not appealed, are shown in italics: 
" * * * and the evidence having closed from which 
it appeared that the material avertments as alleged 
in plaintiff's complaint charging a contract on the 
basis of cost plus 10% contractor's fee is not true nor 
supported by the proof and testimony and that plain-
tiff's complaint is dismissed, that the contract alleged 
in defendant Jesse H. Parry's cross-complaint for the 
sum of $82,000.00 together with all extras and charges 
to be billed by plaintiff at cost plus 10% contractor's 
fee is true and supported by proof and testimony free 
from legal exceptions as to the evidence admissible 
and sufficient in law to entitle the defendant Jesse 
H. Parry to a judgment on his cross-complaint and the 
Court having made and filed in writing its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law ordering and adjudg-
ing that . the plaintiff's cause of action is dismissed 
and that defendant Jesse H. Parry have judgment 
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against the plaintiff on his counterclaim, according to 
law. 
"NOW THEREFORE, on motion of W. D. Beatie, 
attorney for defendant, Jesse H. Parry and pursuant 
to said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
by virtue of the power and authority of the Court, 
and pursuant to the statutes so made and provided, 
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
"1. That the complaint of the plaintiff, Vern B. 
Millard be dismissed and that the plaintiff Vern B. 
Millard release the lien filed in Book 903, page 230 
of the official records of the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, immediately. 
"2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED: That the cross-complaints of the 
defendants Strand Electric Service Company and Otto 
Dreu·s together with the action of John Lee Floor 
Covering L'S. Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry, his 
U'ife, defendants, and Vern B. Millard, cross-defend-
ant. being action No. 96104 which was consolidated 
zcith this action for trial be and the same is hereby dis-
mi.rsed with prejudice. 
"3·. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED: That the defendant Jesse H. Parry, 
having been charged with $92,658.30 as the incidents 
of an $82,000.00 contract of January 29, 1951, to-
gether with extras on said construction work, and 
having paid $93,093.60, have judgment against the 
plaintiff, Vern M. Millard, for the sum of $435.30. 
"4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED: That the counterclaim of the de-
fendant Jesse H. Parry to plaintiff's complaint and the 
counter-claim of plaintiff to defendant's counterclaim 
are denied. 
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"5. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED: That the plaintiff, Vern B. Millard 
having been paid by the defendants, Jesse H. Parry 
for all extras billed until time of trial is denied any 
interest on extras billed during trial and the defendant, 
Jesse H. Parry is to recov~r his costs." (R. 77-78). 
By notice of appeal, the plaintiff further stated: 
"Plaintiff also appeals from every part and portion 
of said judgment and decree adverse to the plaintiff, 
including the denial to plaintiff of recovery against 
the defendants Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry, his 
wife, for interest, court costs, and costs of construction 
for which recovery was not allowed to plaintiff, and 
plaintiff also appeals from the judgment and decree 
whereby defendants Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry, 
his wife, were granted credits against the claims of 
plaintiff whereby said defendants were unjustly en-
riched, and plaintiff appeals from said judgment and 
decree whereby plaintiff was denied judgment for 
counsel fees and whereby plaintL.lf was denied recovery 
against defendants Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry, 
his wife, for amounts justly due and owing to plain-
tiff" (R. 80-81). 
An examination of the record discloses that the recital 
that plaintiff filed a counterclaim to the counterclaim of de-
fendant Jesse H. Parry, is erroneous. 
The judgment also erroneously recites a "cross-complaint" 
whereby defendant Jesse H. Parry is supposed to have alleged 
a contract for $82,000.00 "together with all extras and changes 
to be billed by the plaintiff at cost plus 10% contractor's fee." 
The counterclaim filed by said defendant alleged a contract 
for $82,000.00, but also alleged failure to follow the plans 
and specifications. Said defendant affirmatively alleged that 
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a: 
"material alterations were done by the plaintiff without the 
knowledge or consent of this defendant," and defendants 
sought to escape liability for payment when they well knew 
that either they or their architect had ordered all of the changes 
and alterations made. 
The plaintiff did not appeal from the portion of paragraph 
4 of the judgment and decree whereby the counterclaim of 
defendant Jesse H. Parry is dismissed or "denied." That por-
tion of the judgment is inexorably right. Consequently, the 
other provisions of the judgment whereby defendant Jesse H. 
Parry is declared to be entitled to "judgment on his counter-
claim," are not only contradictory, but absolutely void. Like-
wise, by virtue of denial of his counterclaim, defendant Jesse 
H. Parry was not entitled to have any money judgment what-
soever against the plaintiff, and such provision in the judgment 
for recovery against the plaintiff in the sum of $435.30 is utterly 
void. On one hand, said defendant Parry was "thrown out of 
court'' on his specious counterclaim, while on the other hand 
he was granted a money judgment against the plaintiff. The two 
provisions are contradictory, and plaintiff has appealed only 
from that portion which is adverse to him, the provision dis-
missing the counterclaim being a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
Point 2 
THE ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO RELEASE 
HIS LIEN WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
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As pointed out hereinafter, the court unjustly enriched 
the defendants Parry by allowing them to escape payment 
of many thousands of dollars in cost of construction incurred 
by Mr. Millard by reason of their requests, in consequence of 
their interference with construction, and in consequence of 
the acts and omissions of their agent and architect. There are, 
however, on the face of the record a number of injustices mani-
fested in the judgment entered. 
Even if it were assumed that the defendants Parry ac-
tually owed plaintiff nothing in excess of the amount which 
the court found was due at the time of trial, and the amount 
was paid prior to entry of the judgment, the provision of the 
decree requiring plaintiff to release his lien immediately was 
fundamentally wrong. The dismissal of the action would fully 
and completely operate to extinguish the lien if such dismissal 
were valid and upheld on appeal. There was neither occasion 
nor necessity for ordering release of the lien, and the order 
for release required plaintiff to do a needless act if there 
was no longer any money owing to plaintiff, and such order 
required plaintiff to do an act prejudicial to his rights if there 
is money owing to him. 
The plaintiff was placed in the unfair predicament where 
he either had to comply or face contempt proceedings for 
non-compliance and even face vexatious damage claims. Such 
a provision could have had no other purpose than to dis-
courage an appeal by depriving him of his security in the event 
he should prevail on appeal. The cost of securing a bond to 
stay such a provision would have been prohibitive and such 
a bond would have been impossible to procure. 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In compliance with such order the plaintiff stated that 
he did so under compulsion of said order, and that he in-
tended to secure reversal of such judgment and said order 
on appeal (R. 79). The plaintiff is entitled to his lien until 
paid or until it is foreclosed. As pointed out later, there are 
additional sums owing to plaintiff. 
Point 3 
THE TRIAL COURT UN~AWFULLY PENALIZED 
PLAINTIFF FOR THE DEFAULTS OF DEFENDANTS 
PARRY, BY DENYING PLAINTIFF INTEREST ON SUMS 
FOUND TO BE DUE AND OWING FROM SAID DE-
fENDANTS, AND BY ALLOWING SAID DEFENDANTS 
INTEREST PAID TO THIRD PARTY OBLIGEES AFTER 
TRIAL. 
At the time of trial, thousands of dollars were still owing 
from Defendants Jesse H. Parry and Elsie H. Parry for con-
struction of their new apartment house. It is pointed out here-
inafter in this brief, that there was an unpaid balance of $23,-
033.53 owing from said defendants. The trial court found by 
implication that only $3,803.17 was still due and owing as 
of the time of trial. Said indebtedness found by the court to 
be owing from said defendants at the time of trial, was not 
paid until after trial. 
By paragraph 5 of the judgment and decree the trial 
court denied plaintiff any interest whatsoever, on the untenable 
theory that the unpaid balance was for "extras billed during 
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trial." The conclusions of law are of the same impc rt (R. 75, 
78) . The plaintiff did not bill for extras during trial, and 
even if he had, that would not be ground for denying interest 
from the date when defendants obtained the full benefit. 
During the trial the court ruled that there was no abrogation 
nor recission of the contract dated January 29, 1951, and 
that plaintiff would have to recover on the theory that any 
amounts claimed in excess of the base price of $82,000.00 
were chargeable as extras. The various items of changes were 
then tabulated for convenience of the court and counsel, as 
fxhibit P-14. 
The contention of plaintiff that he is entitled to interest 
on all sums due and owing to him, from November 9, 1951, 
is not limited to the relatively small amount the trial court 
found to be owing to him at the close of the trial. Plaintiff 
claims he is entitled to interest on all sums which he is entitled 
to recover, and that it makes no difference whether this Honor-
able Court rules that plaintiff is entitled to recover only on 
the theory of a subsisting written contract with a right to 
cost plus 10% on extras, or whether the written contract is 
held to have been rescinded or abrogated. Plaintiff claims he 
is entitled to recover interest from and after the date he com-
pleted the work and when the defendants took over, which 
was November 9, 1951. If defendants claim the contract gov-
erns, the latest date would be December 9, 1951, or 30 days 
after the completion of the work, Exhibit P-6. 
Assuming that the original contract dated January 29, 
1951, Exhibits P-6 and D-7, were neither rescinded nor abro-
gated, such instruments do not stop the running of interest 
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until a b lling is made. Such contract leaves payment in the 
hands_ of the architect, who is to determine the amounts to 
be paid, except that the final payment is to be made 30 days 
"after substantial completion of the work provided the work 
be then fully completed and the contract fully performer." 
It is not denied that the last work was done on November 9, 
1951, and defendants have so admitted by their answers (R. 
5, 38, 39, 65). Before Mr. Clarence L. Merrill, construction 
foreman, left the job on November 9, 1951, he asked Mr. 
Parry if there was anything else which he wanted done. 
Defendant Jesse H. Parry testified that he and Mrs. Parry 
went to plaintiff's off ice about October 15, 19 51, "to settle 
this and find out who he owed, what it was, if we could settle 
it in a nice manner, and Mr. Anderson (bookkeeper) couldn't 
come to the terms of what we had paid" (R. 628) . Mr. Parry 
also testified that "at that time it was getting so my wife and 
I. we just decided we couldn't do anything with Mr. Millard 
on this billing. I said if he could furnish me a list of people 
that hadn't been paid we would try and pay them, that we 
would try and settle this in the best manner we possibly could 
ourselves and walked out of the office" (R. 629). He also 
said that Mr. Millard gave him a statement of total costs 
incurred to October 30, 1951, Exhibit P-8 (R. 632). Mr. 
Parry admitted that he had no difficulty verifying the amounts 
owing to subcontractors and materialmen on the job (R. 777-
778). He also admitted that Mr. Millard obtained lien waivers 
when payments were made (R. 776). By answer, Mr. Parry 
admitted "that this defendant has failed, neglected and re-
fused to pay said balance of $24,752.91 due and owing to 
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plaintiff or any part thereof," and also "that plaintiff fur-
nished this defendant record of the amounts owing to material-
men and subcontractors" (R. 40). Mrs. Elsie H. Parry issued 
a check jointly to plaintiff and to Williams Building Supply 
Company on November 8, 1951, to pay the balance owing to 
said material supplier, after verifying the amount unpaid (R. 
630, Exhibit P-13). 
The final statement dated December 5, 1951, covering 
complete costs on the job, was included in a letter written by 
counsel for plaintiff to Mr. and Mrs. Parry dated December 
28, 1951, Exhibit P-9. Said final statement was for $24,752.91 
as the unpaid balance on a total of $111,073.34, which is the 
amount stated in the notice of lien filed January 8, 1952. Said 
letter states in part: 
"It will be necessary to have this matter settled with-
out further delay to prevent the filing of liens. With 
respect to any bills outstanding which remain unpaid, 
it is perfectly agreeable to have them paid directly, 
but it would be preferable to have checks issued jointly. 
In any event we cannot credit you with payment on 
the records of Mr. Millard until we are informed of 
the payment transaction. 
"My suggestion is that you get in touch with me 
so that this matter can be settled promptly and obviate 
the filing of liens." 
It could not be argued with any semblance of candor that 
the plaintiff did not present a bill for the balance due and 
owing. It is significant that the defendants. did not get in 
touch with the plaintiff, nor dispute the correctness of the 
claim until after suit was filed, and not until after the trial 
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was m progress did defendants indicate what or why they 
were attempting to dispute. After the receipt of the letter 
dated December 28, 1951, containing the statement showing 
a balance of $24,752.91, defendants not only refrained from 
registering any objection or questioning the correctness of 
the claim, but paid directly to Johnson Supply Company the 
sum of $426.89 on January 31, 1952, as the balance owing 
to said supply house (Exhibit P-13). There is no dispute about 
the fact that plaintiff allowed defendants credits for the pay-
ments they actually made. 
The indebtedness owing to plaintiff was not paid prior to 
the filing of notice of lien. In fact, by the answer of Jesse H. 
Parry he expressly 
"admits that this defendant has failed, neglected 
and refused to pay said balance of $24,752.91 due 
and owing to plaintiff or any part thereof ... " (R. 40) . 
All of the materials were furnished and all of the labor 
and services were performed on or prior to November 8, 1951. 
Interest began to run on November 9, 1951, at 6% per annum, 
and the denial to plaintiff of interest on the indebtedness was 
wrongful, not only as to the amounts found unpaid at the 
time of trial, but also as to matters and items which the trial 
court should have found were due and owing to plaintiff. 
The defendants paid neither the subcontractors and 
materialmen nor plaintiff. There can be no excuse for saying 
defendants were ignorant as to whom payment should be 
paid. The letter of December 28, 1951, permitted payment 
either jointly to plaintiff and the subcontractors and material-
men, or directly to subcontractors or materialmen. In January, 
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llJ)2 the defendants made two payments directly to material-
men, after defendants received the letter from counsel for 
plaintiffs. 
The statute in effect when the obligation was incurred was 
Section 44-·0-1, U. C.A. 1943: 
"The legal rate of interest for ... things in action 
shall be six per cent per annum . . ." 
An indebtedness existed November 9, 1951, and there was 
a cause of action. Interest accrued from November 9, 1951, 
and the denial of interest was and is unlawful, and constitutes 
an unjust enrichment of the defendants Parry. 
This is particularly true in the light of the fact that the 
defendants did not even pay what the court found they owed, 
until a week after the conclusion of the trial of this case. 
By that time interest had accrued for many months. The trial 
court penalized the plaintiff on the theory that there was no 
"billing" until the time of trial. The assumption was erroneous, 
as hereinabove pointed out, but if such assumption had been 
supported by competent evidence, the holding that plaintiff 
should not recover interest is interdicted by the express language 
of the statute. The court denied plaintiff a substantive right. 
To make matters worse, the court not only denied plain-
tiff interest, but gave defendants Parry full credit for all 
sums paid to Otto Drews, Strand Electric Service Company, 
and John Lee Floor Covering, one week after the trial, which 
sums included interest, attorney fees and costs. By Finding 
of Fact No. 33 the trial court improperly and without foun-
dation, made a finding that the aggregate sum of $4,338.47 
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paid by defendants Parry after the trial, was paid pursuant 
to a stipulation of the parties whereby Jesse H. Parry "would 
be entitled to credit in this action as of the date payment of 
said amount is made'' ( R. 7 -i) . The statement in the finding 
is a misquotation of the stipulation entered into at the request 
of the defendants Parry "to stop the running of interest" (R. 
55). The plaintiff did not stipulate that defendants were 
entitled to credit for the full amount of those payments, but 
only for the portions of those claims on which plaintiff is 
finally adjudged to be liable. Furthermore, even the statement 
in the finding "as of the date when payment is made," could 
not put the defendants in the same position as if they had 
paid such sums back in November, 1951, particularly when 
the costs, attorney fees and interest all accrued due to the 
wilful failure of the defendants Parry to pay. 
The trial court allowed plaintiff the total of $42.75 as 
"Percentage of extras to Strand Electric Service Company and 
John Lee Floor Covering" (R. 74). The method for computing 
such an allowance, defies both law and reason. Findings of 
Fact No. 31 and 32 are indefensible. The court arbitrarily took 
14.5% of the total amount of the interest, attorney fees 
and costs paid on April 10, 1953, to Strand Electric Service 
Company, or $25.15; and 10% of the amount of the interest 
and costs paid on April 10, 1953, to John Lee Floor Coverings, 
or $17.60, making a total of $42.75. This mere pittance was 
awarded to plaintiff in lieu of hundreds of dollars of interest, 
attorney fees and costs incurred by reason of the failure and 
refusal of the defendants to pay. In this case, the defendants 
Parry who were in default for nonpayment, after they had 
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opportunity to pay those materialmen and subcontractors di-
rect, were permitted by the trial court to "turn their own 
del icts into a triumph over their adversary." 
It will be pointed out in subsequent divisions of this 
brief that the trial court unjustly enriched the defendants 
Parry by denying the plaintiff recovery for thousands of dollars 
in costs and expenses incurred at the direction of the Parrys 
and their architect, and also by giving the Perrys credit for 
items which the plaintiff had been instructed to exclude from 
his bid. The plaintiff is entitled to interest from November 9, 
19 51, for all items recoverable on which defendants Parry did 
not make payment until after trial, and also on sums which 
they have never yet made payment and which this Honorable 
Court may find to be justly due and owing to the plaintiff. 
Point 4 
IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW THE DEFAULTING 
DEBTORS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, AND ALSO 
ERROR TO DENY THE PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS. 
Disregarding the claims hereinafter asserted for additional 
thousands of dollars indemnification for building costs incurred 
by plaintiff by reason of the conduct of the defendants, the 
fact remains that at thetime the trial concluded, even the trial 
court found that there was a principal amount of $3,803.17 
still due and owing, after allowing every possible credit to 
defendants including items which plaintiff contends on this 
appeal were not allowable as credits to defendants at all. 
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The defendants Parry did not pay such amount until 
a week after the trial. Not only did the trial court fail to 
allow the plaintiff costs and attorney fees incurred up to that 
time, but the court erroneously assessed the costs and attorney 
fees of the materialmen and subcontractors and also the costs 
of the defendants Parry against the plaintiff! (R. 74, 75, 78). 
When thefinal statement was mailed to defendants Parry 
on December 28, 1951, Exhibit P-9, counsel for plaintiff wrote 
a letter in which he said: "With respect to ~ny bills outstand-
ing which remain unpaid, it is perfectly agreeable to have them 
paid directly, but it would be preferable to have checks issued 
jointly." There was nothing to stop either Mr. or Mrs. Parry 
from making payment. All of the liens, attorney fees, and 
interest and court costs were incurred after that date. Not 
only did the defendants Parry fail to register any objection 
to the amount claimed to be due and owing to Mr. Millard 
at that time, or to the method of computation of the amou!1t 
owing, but Mr. and Mrs. Parry did not dispute any item what-
soever until this suit was filed. 
Rule 68 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is essentially 
thesame as the former code sections 104-44-11 and 104-34-1 : 
" (a) Tender of Money Before Suit. When in an 
action for the recovery of money only, the defendant 
alleges in his answer that before the commencement 
of the action he tendered to the plaintiff the full amount 
to which the plaintiff was entitled, and thereupon de-
posits in court for the plaintiff the amount so tendered, 
and the allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff can 
not recover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant. 
"(b) Offer Before Trial. At any time more than 
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10 days before the trial begins, a party defending 
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an 
offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for 
the money or property or to the effect specified in his 
otier, with costs then accrued ... If the judgment 
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable 
than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred 
after the making of the offer . . . " 
No claim could be made here that defendants made any 
tender to come under (a) of Rule 68 for, as admitted by 
answer of Jesse H. Parry they refused to pay any part of the 
$24,752.91 due and owing to plaintiff." As to (b) the plain-
tiff would be entitled to recover costs up to the time that an 
offer were made, and in this case there was no offer to pay 
anything until after trial when it was determined that the 
defendants Parry would be liable. By that time all of the costs 
had accrued. The making of payment after the trial, to prevent 
third parties from entering judgments against defendants 
Parry could not make the plaintiff here liable for accrued costs. 
Nor does Sec. 38-1-17, U.C.A. 1953, aid the defendants: 
"As between the owner and the contractor the court 
shall apportion the costs according to the right of 
the case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting 
a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including 
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of 
claims of lien." 
In this case, the defendants were in no way prevented 
from paying Otto Drews, Strand Electric Service Company, 
or John Lee Floor Coverings back in 1951, but the defendant 
Elsie H. Parry denied all liability and defendant Jesse H. 
Parry alleged that all of the sums were owing from the plain-
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tiff. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court faifed to 
award plaintiff thousands of dollars in costs of construction 
which he incurred at the request of the architect and the de-
fendants Parry, the trial court did find by implication that as 
of the time of the completion of construction defendant 
Jesse H. Parry owed theprincipal sum of $3,803.17, which 
was unpaid at the time of trial. The amount claimed by Strand 
Electric Service Company including $418.83t in extras ordered 
by defendants Parry aggregated $1,790.03 exclusive of interest 
and costs, the principal claim of Otto Drews was $398.50, and 
the amount of the principal claim of John Lee Floor Cover-
ings including several hundred dollars in extras ordered by 
the Parrys, was $1,762.16. The total of these claims including 
the extras ordered by defendants Parry, aggregated $3950.69, 
or only $147.52 in excess of the amount the trial court found 
the defendants still owed for "extras and changes." 
All of the costs incurred and charged by the third party 
claimants were due to the failure of the defendants to pay 
those claims in the first instance, even after plaintiff offered 
to allow them to make payments direct! y to the claimants 
rather than jointly to plaintiff and the claimants. 
If this Honorable Court holds that the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover additional amounts on which the court below denied 
recovery, or on amounts credited in favor of defendants 
unjustly, then it is even more apparent that the court below 
disregarded the law. If it were assumed that the lower court 
had been right in holding that plaintiff had a claim remaining 
unpaid in the amount of only $3,803.17, it still would have 
been wrong for the court below to assess approximately 90% 
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of the costs and attorney fees against the plaintiff, inasmuch 
as 96.3% of the amount necessary to pay those claims was 
.rti/1 owing from defendants and defendants refused to pay 
the amount owing to plaintiff or any part thereof. 
The trial court assessed against the plaintiff the attorney 
fees and court costs of the three persons who were not paid 
until after the trial, which was wrongful under the statute 
quoted. Furthermore, the court by Finding of Fact No. 18 
admits that plaintiff incurred $10.00 expense and recording 
fee of $1.70 for preparation and filing notice of lien, and 
$25.00 attorney fees, by reason of the refusal of defendant 
Jesse H. Parry to pay the claimed balance due plaintiff (R. 68). 
The court denied the plaintiff recovery of costs and attorney 
fees to which plaintiff was justly entitled. The court improperly 
charged the plaintiff $145.80 costs of the defendants Parry, 
and attorney fees and costs paid by defendants to the th:cc 
claim ants after trial. 
Point 5 
PLAINTIFF REDUCED HIS BID TO $82,000.00 IN 
RELIANCE ON THE DIRECTIONS OF THE ARCHITECT 
FOR OMISSION OF CERTAIN ITEMS, AND ALSO O:N 
THE PROMISE OF ARCHITECT SUPERVISION AND 
NON-INTERFERENCE BY OWNERS, AND ON THE 
REPRESENTATION THAT ADDITIONAL CONSTRUC-
TION WAS BEING AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, SO 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT BOUND WHEN DEFEND-
ANTS DISREGARDED THE CONTRACT AND DE-
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it PRIVED THE PLAINTIFF OF A SUBSTANTIAL POR-
., TION OF THE CONSIDERATION FOR WHICH HE 
BARGAINED. 
The following portion of Finding of Fact No. 5 correctly 
recites: 
"That the plaintiff on or about the lOth day of 
January, 1951 was requested by the defendants Parry 
agent and architect, Leroy W. Johnson, to enter into a 
written contract with the said defendant Jesse H. Parry 
to construct for defendant Jesse H. Parry an apartment 
house upon the land hereinbefore described . . . " 
There is no question about the fact that LeRoy W. John-
son, the architect, was hired by defendant Jesse H. Parry and 
up to and including the time ofexecution of the contract dated 
January 29, 1951, was the agent of the owner. It was not until 
after the signing of such contract that his position became 
that of an impartial supervisor. 
The appellant refers to the Statement of Fact for a de-
tailed narration of the evidence as to events which preceded 
the signing of the contract. The testimony including the ad-
missions of defendants Parry show clearly that unlike the 
orthodox construction project where the contractor purchases 
the materials within certain prescribed specifications, because 
of a fear of government freeze order on certain materials, 
the defendants Parry went out and purchased thousands of 
dollars in equipment and materia;ls before any request for 
bid was entertained, as Mr. Parry explaiqed that they wanted 
materials at their finger tips before signing a contract (R. 
722). Finding of Fact No. 7 is therefore rather enlightening 
(R. 60): 
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"7. Plaintiff and defendant Jesse H. Parry contem-
plated that plaintiff, as a general contractor, would 
have complete charge and supervision of construction 
and be subject to the decisions of the architect, Leroy 
\Xt'· Johnson, as to changes which did not materially 
all<:ct the structure and the interpretation of the plans 
and specifications and that plaintiff would have full 
supervision of the purchase of materials except as to 
Pella window units to enable plaintiff to purchase at 
discounts and thereby to assure himself a margin of 
profit on all items necessary for construction of said 
eleven-unit building except changes and alterations 
which were made by the owner which changes would be 
charged to the defendant Jesse H. Parry on the basis of 
cost plus 10ji." 
There can be no doubt about the fact that the plaintiff 
intended to do his own purchasing, as he explained that 
contractors purchase at a discount which assures them a margin 
of profit in construction (R. 199). Finding of Fact No. 7 is 
correct in those particulars. However, notwithstanding the 
finding as to the intention of the parties, long before there was 
any contract signed, Mr. and Mrs. Parry were making pur-
chases, not only of Pella windows, but of various other items 
including refrigerators, ranges and cabinets. They were already 
exercising some of the functions which the findings indicate 
were intended to be exercised only by the general contractor, 
sometime before there was any contract signed. Then, too, 
at least through their agent and architect, they obtained a 
plumbing bid on January 8, 1951, Exhibit P-4. While Mr. 
Parry professed a lack of recollection of the plumbing deal, 
both he and Mrs. Parry admitted going to Ludlow Plumbing 
Company the early part of January, 1951, to select types and 
colors of fixtures (R. 723). Mr. Parry admitted that the archi-
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teet "suggested that he had talked to a man by the name of 
Barnes and that the fixtures would be bought through the 
Ludlow Plumbing through Mr. Barnes and we would have 
to select colors and that is the .first time we ever seen Mr. 
Barnes" R. 617-618). Defendants Parry went to Ludlow 
Plumbing Company and they met Mr. Barnes there, who 
"was the man that was going to do the plumbing (R. 758). 
Thus, there was a clear understanding between Mr. Parry 
and his architect that Barnes was to do the plumbing and 
that Ludlow Plumbing Company was engaged to furnish 
the plumbing supplies nearly three weeks before Mr. Millard 
signed the contract with Mr. Parry. Plaintiff had nothing to 
do with said transaction. 
It is significant that Exhibit P-4, the plumbing bid dated 
January 8, 1951, addressed to "Mr. and Mrs. Parry," is for 
$5,567.07, and contains the following exceptions: rry his does 
not include sewer or water meter service." The only possible 
reason for inserting such an exception in the bid by the plumber 
would have been an instruction from either the architect or 
the owners to omit the excepted items. Mr. Millard had noth-
ing whatsoever to do with the plumbing bid, and he at no 
time entered into any contract with the plumber (R. 592). 
In this case there were no written instructions to bid. 
Mr. Miles E. Miller, architect, testified that the architect gives 
the instructions as to how to bid, and that contractors are 
supposed to follow the directions of the architect in bidding. 
Mr. Miller further testified that in his experience, Mr. Millard 
has always followed the instructions of the architect (R. 853-
855, 861). Mr. Arthur D. Taylor, another expert witness 
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called by defendants, also testified that the architect governs 
the bidding (R. 905). He also said that there is generally 
a sheet in the specifications containing the instructions to 
bidders, and that such a sheet was not included in any of 
the documents in this case (R. 904-905). 
Because of the hurry of the Parrys to get started, the 
plans were not complete nor "fully coordinated" (R. 337-339). 
The testimony of plaintiff is to the effect that he did not 
see the plans until January 20, 1951, when he was requested 
by the architect to bid. There is no substantial conflict in 
the testimony between plaintiff and the architect as to the 
instructions given by the architect to plaintiff for the prepa-
ration of his bid, although the archiect did not hear the 
te:.;timony of Mr. Millard, having been brought in on subpoena. 
The testimony in reference to those instructions, which include 
the ans\vers the architect gave to some inquires of Mr. Millard, 
1s uncontradicted. 
Mr. Millard was told by the architect that the plans were 
for the 11-unit apartment house, and that other portions of 
the construction project including a six-unit structure on the 
east, as well as sewer and water lines, would come under a 
later contract. The architect told Mr. Millard that the sewer 
and water lines would be stubbed 5 feet out from the build-
ing, and said the project did not include sewer and water lines, 
and that he was to prepare his bid on that basis. He was told 
that he should allow $7,800 to $8,000 for heating, as the 
system originally figured was going to be changed, and the 
new system had not been completely worked out (R. 337-
}39) . When discussion arose over the Pella window units, 
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Mr. Millard stated that he was unfamiliar with that type of 
window, and the architect told him that the unit would be 
set by the brick masons and that he should not allow anything 
for setting those windows (R. 141-158). When Mr. Iviillard 
asked whether the masonry walls should continue on up to 
the top story 13 inches in thickness, the architect told him to 
figure on reducing the walls at the top story (R. 343). Mr. 
Millard submitted his original bid in the amount of $90,000 
(R. 141). 
After Mr. Millard submitted his original bid, the architect 
showed Ivfr. Millard Exhibit P-4, which is the plumbing bid 
addressed to Mr. and Ivirs. Parry dated January 8, 1951, for 
$5,567.07, which contains the statement, "This does not in-
clude sewer or water meter service." l\1r. Johnson told Mr. 
Millard that "This is a legitimate bid. I know this plumber. 
You can use it in your bid" (R. 142). Mr. Millard relied on 
the statements of the architect, going over the items to be 
included and excluded and then gave a bid for $85,212 
(R. 142). The architect then asked plaintiff to reduce his 
figure to $82,000.00, stating that if he would do so, Mr. 
Parry would go ahead and spend $45,000 for the building 
of the 6 unit apartments in front and that plaintiff would do 
the building (R. 142-143, 146-152). The architect said that 
by building both structures together, there would be more 
efficient operation with men and equipment. 
When Exhibit P-6, the contract dated January 29, 1951, 
was presented for signature, plaintiff asked who would super-
vise the job. Plaintiff asked if there would be any undue inter-
ference by the owners at the job site, as Mr. and Mrs. Parry 
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were operating apartment houses, and plaintiff asked if his 
workmen would be free to proceed with work by looking 
directly to the architect for instructions and any clarification 
of drawings and specifications. This was important to plain-
tiff, for when an owner comes on a job and talks to the men 
or makes changes or interferes in any way, it slows down the 
job and makes it more costly (R. 154-155, 344). It is un-
disputed that supervision of construction by an architect is 
far more economical to the contractor, for the architect knows 
more about construction than the owner. Furthermore, Mr. 
l\1iller, witness for defendants, testified that supervision by an 
architect is supposed to be impartial (R. 853). 
Plaintiff testified that he relied on the statements of the 
architect, not only as to the items to be covered by the con-
tract and items to be excluded, but also as to supervision by 
an architect and not by owners, and the assurance that he 
would be awarded construction of the 6 unit apartments in 
front (R. 142-143, 146-152, 154-155, 344). At the time of 
signing, Mr. Parry also instructed Mr. Johnson to go ahead 
with the plans on the 6 unit apartment, and said Mr. 1vfillard 
would build them in conjunction with the 11 unit structure. 
He testified that he relied on the statements of both. 
The portions of Findings of Fact No. 5 and No. 6 which 
recite that plaintiff did not rely upon the statements of Jesse 
H. Parry, in signing the written contract, are entirely erroneous, 
and contradict the undisputed evidence which requires a find-
ing that plaintiff did rely on the statements and representa-
tions of defendant Parry and of his architect. It makes no 
difference whether claim is made that Mr. Parry was personally 
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·~ 
~: 
present and participated in some of the statements made to 
plaintiff which included him to sign the contract. It is undis-
puted that the architect was the agent for Mr. Parry, and 
the court found in a portion of Finding of Fact No. 5 that 
in requesting plaintiff to enter into contract with Mr. Parry, 
said architect was the agent of Mr. Parry, so that it is wholly 
immaterial whether Mr. Parry was even present when the 
architect asked Mr. Millard to cut his bid to $82,000.00. 
Mr. Parry testified that the architect was hired to work 
out the problems for him; that the architect was hired for his 
skill and know-how with respect to the type of equipment 
and other things which should go into the projects (R. 732) ; 
that Mr. Parry directed the architect to work out those prob-
lems for him (R. 733); that Mr. Parry had given the architect 
a big retainer, and lvfr. Johnson was working for him (Mr. 
Parry) (R. 613-614); that on various matters he told Mr. 
Johnson that he was leaving things to his own judgment R. 
733); that Mr. Parry wanted to be sure the heating would 
be adequate, and that working out the heating sysetm was 
left to Mr. Johnson as that was what he was hired for (R. 732, 
744). 
Notwithstanding the architect at that time was the agent 
of the owners, and notwithstanding the admissions of witnesses 
for defendants that the architect gives directions as to bidding 
and governs the bidding, and that the contractor is to follow 
the directions of the architect, defendants Parry seek the bene-
fits of all of the statements and representations made which 
induced plaintiff to sign a contract for $82,000 which was 
less than even the architect's estimate of costs as hereinafter 
> 
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illustrated; and at the same time the defendants Parry seek 
to escape all liability for such statements to insure their unjust 
enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff. It was intended 
that plaintiff should rely on the statements, directions, as-
surances and representations made to him by the architect. 
If the Parrys now claim something else was intended by them, 
there was no meeting of minds and no valid written contract 
anyway. 
All of the statements and representations and assurances 
made to the plaintiff were and are material, and represent 
differences in costs and expenses to plaintiff amounting to 
thousands of dollars. Those statements and representations 
included: (a) The statement that the sewer and water lines 
were not a part of the construction project on which plaintiff 
\\'<IS to bid but were to be covered by a separate contract. (b) A 
statement that Mr. Millard could rely on and base his bid on 
the plumbing bid of Grant E. Barnes for $5,567.07, Exhibit 
P -.J. (c) A statement that plaintiff should not figure on a 
13 inch wall for the third story. (d) A statement that the 
Pella window units with which plaintiff was unfamiliar were 
the type which would be set by the brick masons, and that 
plaintiff should not allow any expense in his bid for ·Setting 
the windows. (e) A statement that the heating \vas being 
worked out and that plaintiff should make an allowance of 
$7800 to $8000 only for the heating. (f) A statement that 
supervision would be by the architect and not by owners, so 
that plaintiff would not incur excessive costs incident to owner 
supervision. (g) The assurance that plaintiff would be awarded 
construction of the 6 unit apartment in front, to construct 
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simultaneously with the 11 units, at a figure of. not to exceed 
.$-45,000. 
It is not necessary in this case to show that either Ivlr. 
Parry or Mr. Johnson, the architect, intended to deceive or 
to mislead the plaintiff. Assuming that any of the statements 
were false, plaintiff was misled into signing the contract, and 
there was no meeting of the minds. The plaintiff did not even 
have to show that either Mr. Parry or his agent, the architect, 
knew that any of the statements made were false, as plaintiff 
would have a right to rescind. 
In the case of Ogden Valley Trout & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 
41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687, this Honorable Court said: 
" * * * In what way does it affect the party who is 
deceived or misled and thereby induced to enter into 
a contract or assume an obligation by representations 
that in fact are untrue, whether he who makes them 
knew them to be so or not? * * * In an action for a 
rescission, where the only consequences sought to be 
reached by the action is to rescind and to place the 
parties in status quo, a ·different rule prevails. Why 
should he who makes false representations be per-
mitted to profit by them, whether he knew they were 
false or not? Upon the other hand, why should the 
party who is deceived be bound by a contract based upon 
false representations simply because he cannot prove 
that the other party to the contract knew the statements 
when made were false. We have recently passed upon 
this identical question in the case of Smith v. Columbus 
Buggy Co. et al., 125 Pac. 580, and we there held that, 
in case of rescission, it is not necessary to prove that 
the party who made the false representations knew them 
to be false when he uttered them, if such representa-
tions wre in fact material and false and induced the 
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other party to enter into a contract that he would not 
have entered into otherwise." 
The foregoing case has never been overruled, and 
it is still sound law. In Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Elli-
son, 2)<) P. 29, it was pointed out that a person in-
duced to act by representations is not bound to make an 
independent investigation to determine the truth of state-
ments in order to rely on them. In this case the witnesses for 
defendants testified that the architect gives the instructions 
on how to bid, and that contractors are supposed to follow 
the instructions of the architect in bidding (R. 853-855, 861). 
How could a contractor follow the architect's instructions if 
he did not rely on him? The findings of the court of non-
reliance are contrary to the evidence. In fact, there is no evi-
dence whatsoever upon which to base the findings that plain-
ti:f did not rely upon the representations made to him. 
Courts of equity have granted relief even from unilateral 
mistake, where a party has been misled. In Sellars v. Grant, 
196 F. 2d 677, cancelation of an assignment of interest in an 
oil lease was sought on the ground defendant had misrepre-
sented the distance of the land in question from the discovery 
well. The defense was that the seller did not know, and that 
the mistake was only unilateral. The United States Court of 
Appeals said: 
"Grant believed he was bargaining for a mineral 
lease on lands located within a mile and a half or 
two miles from the Carter discovery well. Considering 
the purpose which Grant had in mind in acquiring the 
lease, the proximity of the property to the discovery 
wel was obviously a material fact. If the appellee's 
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version of the transaction is to be believed and it was 
credited by the trial judge, who had an opportunity 
to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of the 
witnesses, the mistake was induced by Sellars and it 
was induced in order that it might be acted upon. This 
of course, gave Grant a right to rescind the transaction. 
4 Williston on Contracts, § 1487. And this is true even 
though the party making the misrepresentation did so 
innocently. See Willison on Contract § 1500. The rule 
is bottomed on the sound reasoning that it would be 
unjust to allow one who has made material false rep-
resentations, however innocently, to retain the fruits 
of a bargain induced thereby. Duncan v. Hogue, 24 
Miss. 671; 23 Am. Jur. 819." 
In this case there was no material conflict in the evidence, 
for not only did the plaintiff testify to the statements made 
by the architect, but the architect who was compelled to testify 
under subpoena admitted making the statements. It is wholly 
immaterial whether Mr. Parry told him to make those particular 
representations, inasmuch as the architect was hired by Mr. 
Parry and the matter of bidding was left to the architect, and 
Mr. Millard was expected to deal with the architect (R. 770). 
Exhibit D-17, last sheet, contains the architect's estimate 
of costs, which he gave to defendant Jesse H. Parry some time 
prior to January 29, 1951 (R. 736-73·8). The total of the 
figures shown on said sheet is the sum of $81,879, or just $121 
less than the $82,000 to which the architect asked plaintiff 
to reduce his bid. It is signficant that said estimate sheet which 
totals nearly $82,000 shows nothing for taxes, insurance or 
any overhead expense of the general contractor which amount.r 
to approximately 10% of construction costs, and nothing what-
soever for the services of the contractor. Thus, defendant Parry 
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had in his possession at the time the architect asked the plain-
tiff to reduce his bid to $82,000, an estimate of costs which 
shows on its face that it covers nothing whatsoever for over-
head expenses nor any fee to the contractor. Mr. Parry as a 
business man could not have been unaware of these items. 
It is also significant that said architect's estimate speci-
fically refers to Exhibit P-4: "Plumbing complete, Bid by 
B(trnes & Chase 5567.00," which was the amount plaintiff 
was instructed by the architect to use as the plumbing figure, 
and also exclude the sewer and water lines. The estimate sheet 
also refers to "Heating-Hotwater Radiation and Domestic 
Hotu·ater generator-Architect's Est. 8100." Thus, the de-
fendants furnished the evidence which corroborates the testi-
mony of both plaintiff and the architect. The evidence required 
a finding that plaintiff did rely on the statements of the 
architect. 
There is still another reason why it could not be assumed 
that plaintiff just simply made a "mistake," or that he reduced 
his bid to a figure below cost without any inducement to do 
so. The cost of the Lindsay Apartments, which plaintiff was 
then constructing, was $78,500.00. While it is true that a 
substantial portion of the additional costs of the Parry Apart-
ments arose sometime later by the addition of various items 
not found in the Lindsay Apartments, the fact is that there 
was a total of 1,200 feet more floor space in the Parry apart-
ments which would cost from $9,600 to $10,800. If the lower 
figure of $9,600 were added to the $78,500 cost of the Lindsay 
Apartments, the figure would be increased to $88,100. In 
addition, there were metal cabinets, more expensive windows 
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and other items in the Parry Apartments, which would readily 
bring the cost figure to the $90,000 originally bid by plaintiff. 
After Exhibit P-4 was exhibited to plaintiff, and plaintiff was 
told to rely on that figure of $5,567.07, and also told not 
to figure more than $7,800 to $8,000 for heating, plaintiff 
reduced his bid to $85,.212. All the way along, the plaintiff 
relied on the statements and information given by the architect. 
Finally, when he was asked to cut off $3,212 more, he did 
so in reliance on the promise of architect-supervision and 
non-interference by owners, and on the assurance that he 
would be awarded construction of the 6 unit apartment in 
front. 
There is no basic contradiction in the evidence as to the 
-· promise of the defendant Parry to proceed with construction, 
when the evidence produced on cross-examination is taken 
into consideration. While Mr. Parry said he told the architect 
.in January that he could not finance construction, he admitted 
that what he said was that he could not finance construction 
without mortgaging the entire property, and that he would 
have to go elsewhere for finance (R. 725, 734). It is true 
that Mr. Parry promised to go head if he could make satis-
factory financial arrangements, but such a statement must be 
viewed from the standpoint of a ·person acting reasonably and 
in good faith. Mr. Parry admitted that he refused to mortgage 
the property because the loan company wanted a mortgage 
on the entire property, and he was willing to mortgage only 
the front (R. 188-189, 725, 734). The excuse for not execut-
ing a mortgage was wholly unreasonable, for as indicated by 
Exhibit P-10 which were in the possession of defendants, the 
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construction of the front units would attach to existing con-
struction, and no reasonable lender would accept a mortgage 
on only a portion of a unified structure. 
The fact that the architect proceeded immediately with 
plans on the 6 unit structure upon signing of the contract, 
Exhibits P-6 and D-7, indicates that the parties all contem-
plated that such a structure was to be built. The fact that 
those plans were revised in April, 1951, clearly indicates that 
Ivfr. Parry did not tell the architect to stop prior to that date, 
and the evdience is conclusive that the latter part of April 
no further work was done on the plans for the reason that 
~1r. Parry said he was unwilling to mortgage the entire prop-
erty. Mr. Parry's admission that he made a "mistake" by 
not giYing the architect written notice to discontinue his work 
on the 6 unit apartments, and the fact that Mr. Millard was 
asked to present cost figures in March, shows that the project 
was abandoned by Mr. Parry some weeks after he held it out 
as a definite assurance to Mr. Millard to get a low figure on 
the 11 unit apartments. 
Exhibit P-21 is a newspaper article concerning this project 
published in the Salt Lake Tribune on February 18, 1951, 
which said defendants had in their possession. Even if the 
testimony of Mr. Parry were accepted as true that it was the 
architect who fostered the publicity (R. 735-736, 764), the 
cut which appears in the article was admittedly furnished by 
:Mr. Parry himself, and it would be irtcredible to allow the 
architect to proceed with publicity on a project on which he 
then did not intend to proceed. The article states: 
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"Plans for $125,000 in apartment construction in 
the university district were announced Saturday by 
Jesse H. Parry. 
"Construction will be done on property at 160-13th 
East, on which there now stands an apartment house 
containing eight units. 
"Plans are to add to the rear of the existing build-
ing a structure containing 11 two-bedroom units and 
another at the front housing six bachelor apartments. 
"Both of the new additions will be three stories 
and of golden buff brick. Work on the rear addition 
will start immediately, with completion scheduled by 
Sept. 15. Vern B. Millard has the contract. 
''The front addition is to be started this summer and 
completed before winter. 
"The rear unit, which will be air conditioned and 
will feature garbage disposal units and other modern 
conveniences, will cost approximately $85,000. The 
front portion will cost $40,000." 
It is not denied that when ~fr. Parry informed the plain-
tiff in March or April that he was not going ahead with the 
6 unit apartments, Mr. Millard complained that it meant 
greater costs to him, and that Mr. Parry said he would see 
to it that Mr. Millard got his contractor's percentage above 
the costs (R. 190). According to the architect, Mr. Parry said 
he did not intend that Mr. Millard would be injured fman-
cially by puting off indefinitely the construction of the 6 units 
(R. 335-336). 
Thus, the promise of award to Mr. Millard of construc-
tion of the 6 units, which induced the signing of the contract 
at a figure below cost on the 11 units, was abrogated, not by 
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mutual agreement, but by the decision of Mr. Parry. Honest 
dealings would require that under the circumstances, the 
contractor woudl be paid all of his costs of construction, and 
Mr. Parry so indicated to Mr. Millard. Mr. Millard was de-
prived of consideration worth thousands of dollars by the 
abandonment of the other construction project. 
The evidence also shows that within two months after 
signing of the contract, the owners not only abandoned the 
second construction project which was one of the major in-
ducements for reduction of the bid on the 11 unit apartments 
to $82,000 or a figure below actual costs; but the owners dis-
regarded the written contract which guarantees architect-
supervision (and which contract impliedly covenants against 
owner supervision and owner interference). The plaintiff was 
thereby deprived of additional thousands of dollars in con-
sideration. 
The plaintiff was the innocent victim of the struggle be-
tween the owners and the architect over who should boss the 
project. The court disregarded the undisputed evidence by 
finding of Fact No. 10, for the defendants Parry did not 
come onto the site merely to observe the progress of construc-
tion, and they did not limit the purchase of materials to 
Pella windows, but they purchased numerous items. In con-
tradiction of that finding, the testimony of the Parrys clearly 
shows that the plans were incomplete and insufficient, and 
the Parrys admitted that they had controversies with the archi-
tect and that his services were terminated on July 19, 1951. 
Finding of Foct No. 10 also contradicts Finding of Fact No. 
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9 (R. 61-62), which shows that the contract required super-
vision by the architect, not by the owners: 
"Art. 38. Architect'J Status.-The Architct shall have 
general supervision and direction of the work . . . 
"As the Architect is, in the first instance, the inter-
preter of the conditions of the Contract and the judge 
of its performance, he shall side neither with the 
Owner nor with the Contractor, but shall use his powers 
under the contract to enforce the faithful performance 
by both. 
"In case of the termination of the employment of 
the Architect, the Owner shall appoint a capable and 
reputable Architect, against whom the Contractor 
makes no reasonable objection, whose status under the 
ccntract shall be that of the former Architect; any 
dispute in connection with such appointment to be sub-
ject to arbitration. 
"Art. 39. Architect's Decisions.-The Architect shall, 
within a reasonable time, make decisions on all claims 
of the Owner or Contractor and on all other matters 
relating to the execution and progress of the work 
or the interpretation of the Contract Documents. 
"The Architect's decisions, in matters relating to 
artistic effect, shall be final, if within the terms of the 
Contract Documents.'' 
As previously indicated, supervision by an architect is 
far more economical to the contractor for the reason the 
architect knows more about construction than the owner. It 
is undisputed that owner supervision is far more costly. 
In this case there was no controversy between the plaintiff 
and the owners with respect to performance by the contractor. 
Mr. Parry admitted that he had no controversies with ~1r. 
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Millard or with his foreman, Mr. Merrill. He said that both 
were very nice on the job and they did what they were asked 
to do (R. 747). Mr. Merrill never refused to do anything Mr. 
Parry asked him to do (R. 715). Mr. Parry further testified 
that he asked for various things to be done and Mr. Millard 
and his foreman were willing to do anything they asked, as 
he told them he had the money to pay for it and he wanted 
things done the way he wanted them as that was what he was 
paying for (R. 747). Mr. Parry also testified to errors in plans 
(R. 660, 705-706), and as to changes made because of dis-
crepancies in measurements. As to changes made in cabinets, 
he said his wife looked after that detail (R. 705-706). 
The Parrys began to find fault with the architect, and 
to give their own instructions. When they talked to employees 
the men did no work (R. 157-159). It is undisputed that Mr. 
Millard complained that his men were losing too much time 
on the job, and that it was costing him money. It is also un-
disputed that Mr. Johnson, the architect, requested the Parrys 
to deal with him, and not talk to workmen or subcontractors, 
as it was resulting in a ~haotic condition on the job. Plaintiff 
complained both to the architect and to the Parrys during 
the latter part of June or the first part of July, that the inter-
ference of the Parrys was costing money. Mr. Parry said he 
did not want Mr. Millard to feel that he would lose money 
on the project, and that he would see to it that Mr. Millard 
was taken care of, but that they (the Parrys) wanted the 
structure built the way they wanted it, and that it was their 
money that was going into the building. It was finally a 
question whether the architect or Mr. Parry would supervise 
the job, and finally on July 19, 1951, Mr. Parry told the 
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architect he no longer wanted his services on that job (R. 
3-15-458). Mr. Parry testified that he thought he was qualified 
to supervise construction, although his business is that of a 
restaurant operator (R. 773). 
Prior to termination of the services of the architect, the 
defendants Parry not only engaged in heated arguments and 
controversies with the architect, but they quarreled with each 
other at the job site over which one should have his or her 
way as to how work was to be done or what changes were 
to be made (R. 160-161, 345-347, 715, 717, 719). Instead of 
impartial professional supervision of an architect which plain-
tiff bargained for, there was imposed on him owner-supervision 
and inter~erence which was not even harmonious as to the 
owners themselves. 
There was such imposition on the plaintiff that no one 
m good conscience could expect him to build for $82,000 
when he was deprived of thousands of dollars of consideration 
for which he bargained, both in the written agreement and 
in the inducement made for execution of the written instru-
ment at a reduced price. 
Point 6 
EVEN IF THE CONTRACT WERE NOT VOIDABLE, 
IT COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO REQUIRE PLAIN-
TIFF TO FURNISH ITEMS IN EXCESS OF THOSE ON 
WHICH THE ARCHITECT AS AGENT OF OWNERS 
INSTRUCTED PLAINTIFF TO BASE HIS BID, AND 
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PLAINTIFF IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
ADDITIONAL SUMS. 
Appellant does not concede that he is in error in argument 
of Point 5, but even if he were, the trial court was in error 
in construing the written contract dated January 29, 1951, to 
require plaintiff to furnish items in excess of those on which 
the architect instructed the plaintiff to base his bid. 
As indicated in Finding of Fact No. 9, under general 
conditions of the contract, Exhibit P-3, there are the following 
specific provisions which admittedly were in the hands of 
the contractor at the time he was requested to bid (R. 61): 
"Art. 2. * * * It is not intended, however, that 
materials or work not covered by or properly infer-
able from any heading, branch, class or trade of the 
specifications shall be supplied unless distinctly so 
noted on the drawings. * * * 
"Art. 3. Detail Drawings and Instructions. - The 
Architect shall furnish, with reasonable promptness, 
additional instructions, by means of drawings or other-
wise, necessary for the proper execution of the work. 
All such documents and instructions shall be consist-
tent with the Contract Documents, true developments 
thereof, and reasonably inferable therefrom. 
"The work shall be executed in conformity therewith 
and the Contractor shall do no work without proper 
drawings and instructions. * * * " 
The contract documents also specify that the contractor 
shall not be responsible for the existence or discovery of errors, 
inconsistencies or omissions in the drawings, specifications and 
other instructions. All of the mistakes, errors, contradictions 
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and omissions in the plans were chargeable to defendant Jesse 
H. Parry as the acts of his agent. Finding of Fact No. 8 is 
correct only as far as it recites that defendant Jesse H. Parry 
engaged LeRoy W. Johnson, but it is incorrect in attempting 
to limit the employment of the architect to the 11 unit apart-
ment. 
The trial court by Finding of Fact No. 24 erroneously 
allowed the defendants credit in the sum of $1,215.32 for 
construction of the sewer (R. 69-70). The defendant Jesse 
H. Parry himself made the contract with Mr. Chase, the 
plumber, for the installation of the sewer (R. 694). Defendant 
admitted that it was not constructed in accordance with the 
master plot plan (R. 762-763). 
The court predicated allowance of such credit of $1,215.32 
on the theory that "the specifications under the contract of 
January 29, 1951, provided for connecting the sewer system 
of the structure to the Salt Lake City system." The "General 
Conditions of the Contract" to which the specifications are 
attached, Exhibit P-3 contain two provisions, one of which 
is embodied in Finding of Fact No. 9: 
"Art. 2. * * * It is not intended, however, that ma-
terials or work not covered by or properly inferable 
from any heading, branch, class or trade of the speci-
fications shall be supplied unless distinctly so noted on 
the drawings" (Italics added). 
It is undisputed that the sewer line is not shown on the 
drawings, Exhibit P-2. Furthermore, ~xhibit D-16, the master 
plot plan, which had not been prepared until about April, 
1951, which was in the possession of the defendants at the 
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time of trial, clearly shows that the sewer line was not a part 
of the 11-unit project, but part of Project No.2.Furthermore, 
the typewritten specifications, were not merely intended by the 
architect to cover the 11-unit apartment, but the additional 
6-unit apartment structure which defendants abandoned (R. 
330). The "General Conditions of the Contract," also contain 
the following: 
"Art. 35. Separate Contracts.-The Owner reserves 
the right to let other contracts in connection with the 
work. The Contractor shall afford other contractors 
reasonable opportunity for the introduction and storage 
of their materials and the execution of their work, 
and shall properly connect and coordinate his work 
and theirs." 
Tbe contract documents were prepared by the architect 
who was the agent of the owners, and such documents would 
have to be construed against the owners in case of any uncer-
tainty or ambiguity or any inconsistency. The contract reserved 
the right to the owners to "let other contracts in connection 
with the work." There is no dispute about the fact that Mr. 
Parry let a contract for the sewer to Mr. Chase (R. 694). 
The sewer was not run between the buildings down the drive-
\-vay as he said the architect told him it was supposed to be 
run, and as shown on the plot plan, but diagonally across the 
portion of the property where the 6-unit apartments were 
to have been erected (R. 762-763). Instead of using clay 
pipe, cast iron pipe was used (R. 580). Cast iron pipe is con-
siderably more expensive. The trial court allowed a credit 
not only ·for what the sewer would have cost as specified, 
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but the entire cost with aditional length and with the use of 
cast iron pipe. 
The trial judge ruled that plaintiff should have installed 
the sewer, saying that the building could not be used without 
the se;_t·er; but such a statement begs the question. It is not a 
question of whether the sewer was necessary, but whether the 
architect in giving instructions on bidding, directed the con-
tractor to include in his bid that phase of the work. The evi-
dence is undisputed that not only did the owner reserve the 
right to let other contracts, but the architect expressly told 
plaintiff that the sewer was not a part of this particular con-
struction project, but a part of the 6-unit apartment project 
(R. 146, 333). Plaintiff's version of the architect's instruction 
on bidding was that the owner was going to take care of the 
sewer. Another fallacy in the reasoning of the trial judge arises 
from allowing defendant Parry and his witnesses to interpret 
the contract documents, which is a function of the trial court. 
The contract does not specify that the specification shall con-
trol over the drawings, but just the opposite is true. The draw-
ings control, for the reason that no work is required unless 
shown on the drawings, for as illustrated on the face of Ex-
hibit P-6, "The Contractor shall furnish all of the materials 
and perform all of the work shown on the Drawings and de-
scribed in the Specifications," and the contract provisions 
specifically state that "It is not intended, however, that materials 
or work . . . shall be supplied unless distinctly so noted on 
the drawings." 
Thus, the credit allowed by the court for the sewer was 
erroneous for each of the following reasons: (a) The architect 
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who gave instructions on biading specifically instructed the 
plaintiff not to include the sewer in his bid. (b) The contract 
reserves to the owner the right to let other contracts in con-
nection with the work, and the owners did let the sewer con-
tract. (c) The sewer is not shown on the drawings with re-
spect to the 11-unit apartments; and even the revised plot plan, 
Exhibit 16, shows that the sewer was a part of the project 
involving the construction of the 6-unit apartments. (d) The 
architect, by letter to the contractor, a copy of which was 
delivered to the Parrys, states that the sewer was deleted from 
the construction project. (e) In letting the sewer contract, the 
owners not only had the line run diagonally to make it longer, 
but also of cast iron pipe to make it more expensive. 
The credit of $1,215.32 amounted to giving the defendants 
"something for nothing," by ta:.;:ing that amount away from 
the plaintiff unlawfully. 
The trial court allowed defendants a credit of $400.00 
for the difference in the cost of the upper portion of the brick 
walls, on the theory that the plans called for 13-inch walls. 
The architect admitted that showing those walls to be 13 inches 
for the third story was an error, and that he instructed the 
plaintiff to graduate the wall (R. 343) . The trial court was 
in error in granting defendants credit for $400.00 when their 
own architect, acting as their agent in giving instructio~s on 
how to bid, express! y told the plaintiff at the outset not to 
bid on a 13-inch wall at the third story, but only on a 9-inch wall. 
The architect also instructed the plaintiff to allow from 
$7,800 to $8,000 for heating, as the plans were not worked 
out at that time (R. 339). It was not until April 14, 19Yl, 
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that the architect had a heating contract worked out with 
D. A. Olson Company, and the architect instructed plaintiff 
to execute that contract for $7,875.00 (Exhibit P-27). The 
contract which the architect submitted for the signature of 
plaintiff did not cover all of the items, for said company 
charged as extras $500.00 for domestic hot water system (Ex-
hibit 28) and Item 37 of list of extras), and $207.23 as a 
charge for bathroom vents (Item 33 of list of extras). The 
total of the heating items thus amounted to $8,582.23 or 
$582.23 in excess of the maximum amount the architect in-
structed the plaintiff to allow for heating. 
Likev.'ise, with respect to the plumbing, the architect 
expressly instructed the plaintiff not to figure on sewer or water 
lines. Therefore, when the owners called on plaintiff to have 
the water line installed, plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed 
therefor in the amount of $294.00 paid by him (Item 34 of 
the list of extras). 
The architect presented to plaintiff on January 28, 1951, 
Exhibit P-4, which is a plumbing bid addressed to Mr. and 
Mrs. Parry for plumbing in the amount of $5,567.07, which 
bid expressly states: "This does not include sewer or water 
service." It is significant that Exhibit D-17, which is the archi-
tect's estimate of costs in the aggregate amount of $81,879, 
which was delivered by the architect to Mr. Parry some time 
prior to January 29, 1951, contains no allowance for insurance, 
taxes, contingencies nor overhead expense, nor any allowance 
for the services of the contractor, but said figures show a 
heating estimate of $8,100.00 and "Plumbing complete, Bid 
by Barns & Chase 5567.00."The actual plumbing costs, exclusive 
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of the sewer and water lines, amounted to $918.43 net cost or 
$1,010.61 with the 10% contractor's allowance, in excess of 
the $5,567.07. The disallowance of that entire amount of excess 
over the $5,567.07 was obviously a matter of just enrichment 
to defendants, for the plaintiff was instructed to base his figure 
on the $5,567.07, and that anything above that figure would 
be handled on a separate basis (R. 371-3,74). 
Another item on which the architect instructed the plain-
tiff to make no allowance whatsoever was for installation of 
the Pella windows which were· purchased by the defendants 
Parry. Plaintiff had nothing to do with the ordering of those 
windows, and he told the architect he was not familiar with 
them, and he requested information as to cost of installation. 
The architect informed plaintiff that the windows would be 
installed by the brick masons, and that he should not figure 
any carpenter labor for such installations (R. 146). Plaintiff 
relied on the statements of the architect and agent for the 
Parrys. It will be noted that on Exhibit D-17, which is the 
architect's estimate of costs, nothing is specifically allowed 
for installation of the windows. 
Item No. 48 on Exhibit P-14 shows that the installation 
of the Pella windows actually involved $252 in materials 
and also $1,800 in labor, with $205.20 as the 10% allowable 
to the contractor would aggregate $2,257.20. The cost of 
this additional work is due to the failure to show on the plans 
the necessary details, and also the instructions of the architect 
to allow nothing for installation because they could be set 
by the brick masons (R. 221-222). Those instructions proved 
to be misleading. The trial court disregarded the facts, and 
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disallowed the plaintiff recovery of any part of his costs, al-
though it was undisputed that the mistakes were the mistakes 
of Mr. Parry and his architect. The windows did not arrive 
on the job until after the job was well along. 
As illustrated in argument of Point 8 hereinafter, plain-
tiff was entitled to recover on the basis of cost plus 10% for 
additions, changes and extras, under the findings of the trial 
court. 
Mr. Taylor, expert witness for defendants, admitted on 
cross-examination that it is not unusual for the specifications 
to cover more than the particular project contracted (R. 903). 
He also admitted that the architect governs the bidding (R. 
905). Mr. Miller, the architect, testified that the contractor is 
supposed to follow the instructions of the architect in bidding 
(R. 853-855). 
Until the architect becomes a supervisor of construction 
under a contract, he is the agent of the owner. Why should 
the contractor be penalized for any of the owner's mistakes? 
Why should the contractor, who is supposed to follow the 
instructions of the architect in excluding or limiting the items 
covered by a bid, be penalized for observing the directions of 
the architect to exclude certain items and to limit allowance 
for certain items to definite sums? This is not a case where 
the contractor miscalculates costs and in consequence thereof 
bids too low; but this case involves a situation where the con-
tractor followed the instructions of the architect as to what 
items to exclude and what figures to allow in his bid. It would 
constitute a fraud on the part of the owner to enrich himself 
by the acts of his architect in obtaining a lower figure by in-
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structions to omit certain items and to limit allowance for 
other items, and then to later claim that the contractor must 
furnish the very items which the architect induced the con-
tractor to omit in whole or in part. 
By way of recapitulation, the trial court erred in allowing 
credits to the Parrys, and in denying plaintiff recovery for 
costs in excess of the sums he was instructed by the architect 
to allow for specific items: 
Credits unjustly allowed to defendants: 
Contracts made by defendant on sewer 
line --------------------------------------------$1,215.32 
Difference in cost of masonry 
walls ------------------------------------------ 400.00 
Additional costs incurred by plaintiff over 
amounts the architect instructed plaintiff to 
use or to allow: 
Heating (additional costs) __________ 582.23 
Water line ----------------------------~------- 294.00 
Additional plumbing costs over the figure 
of $5,567.07---------------------------- 1,010.61 
Cost of installation of Pella window 
units ------------------------------------------ 2,2 57.20 
$1,615.32 
$4,144.04 
Total ------------------------------------------------------$5,759. ?··5 
The court was clearly in error in refusing to allow plaintiff 
his additional costs and also in error in giving the defendant 
credit for items which were not allowable as credits, by reason 
of excluding items from his bid or restricting allowances pur-
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suant to the architect's instruction. As previously indicated, 
plaintiff is entitled to interest on those amounts from Novem-
ber 9, 1951. 
Point 7 
THE PURPORTED AGREEMENT WHICH THE COURT 
FOUND WAS MADE ON JULY 19, 1951, IS CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE, AND WOULD DEPRIVE PLAIN-
TIFF OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS WITHOUT CON-
SIDERATION. 
By Point 5 the appellant conten-ds that the contract dated 
January 29, 1951, at the low figure of $82,000 was induced 
by the directions of the architect as agent of the Parrys to 
omit certain items, and also by promise of architect-supervision 
and non-interference by the owners, and by the assurance 
that plaintiff would be awarded construction of the 6 unit 
apartments; and that by reason of non-performance on the 
part of defendants by failure to proceed with said additional 
construction, by refusing to pay for the additional costs in-
curred by plaintiff in excess of the figures which the architect 
tol-d plaintiff to use, and by depriving plaintiff of complete 
architect supervision, plaintiff was denied a substantial part 
of the consideration for which he bargained and which induced 
said contract at a reduced figure. If such contract was not 
abrogated prior to July 19, 1951, then on July 19, 1951, said 
contract was repudiated by the defendant Jesse H. Parry by 
terminating the services of the architect, and by failure to 
employ another competent architect. 
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Finding of Fact No. 10 (R. 62-63) contradicts even the 
admissions of the defendants as well as the other evidence. 
The finding among other things is contrary to the evidence 
for it recites that after termination of the services of the archi-
tect, the "defendant Jesse H. Parry did agree with the plaintiff 
to complete said construction without the services of an archi-
tect in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract 
of January 29, 1951, and in accordance with the plans and 
specifications on said structure and that defendant Jesse H. 
Parry would advance to the plaintiff upon billing by said 
plaintiff, the 10% being withheld under the trems of the 
contract until completion, and that defendant Jesse H. Parry 
did not, in violation of Article 38 of said specifications, fail, 
neglect and refuse to appoint another architect." 
The court disregarded all of the evidence which shows 
that the defendant Jesse H. Parry terminated the services of 
the architect and did not even ask plaintiff whether he wanted 
another architect, but said he was taking over supervision. 
As indicated in the contract, architect supervision is required 
to be impartial. Owne1'-supervision could not possibly be im-
partial. Mr. Millard had complained about owner interference, 
and his complaints were based upon the fact that it was costing 
him money. The finding that termination of the services of 
the architect without appointing a new architect was not in vio-
lation of the contract, is a gross misinterpretation of the con-
tract. No sane contractor would entertain owner supervision 
without some substantial consideration to compensate him for 
the increased costs. The evidence does not show any such 
agreement as the court found, when the cross-examination of 
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both Mr. and Mrs. Parry is taken into consideration. There 
is nothing in the evidence to show that Mr. Millard assented 
to any such proposal as even Mr. Parry testified that he made. 
Mr. Parry said Mr. Millard told him he would have 
nothing but a shell, and that they could work together to 
get the building completed (R. 623). Mr. Parry testified 
that at that time he had paid Mr. Millard up to the contract 
price and was withholding 10%, and that he told Mr. Millard 
he would pay him the 10% he had been withholding (R. 624). 
The testimony that Mr. Parry had paid Mr. Millard up to 
the contract price is not true, for only $64,896.43 had been 
paid. Furthermore, there is no proof of any assent on the 
part of plaintiff, and contrary to the finding of the court, }.1r. 
Millard did not bill Mr. Parry for the 1 O% withheld and the 
10% was not paid as such, as shown by Exhibit P-13. The 
billings by Mr. Millard were on the basis of costs plus 10% 
from and after August 1, 1951 (See Exhibit P-13) Mrs. Elsie 
H. Parry, who issued all of the checks, paid on the basis of 
the costs at first, and then made only partial payments. 
Mr. Parry testified that he felt that he was qualified to 
supervise and that he believed his money would carry him 
through (R. 773). That does not sound very much like he 
was claiming he was relying on any contract. Defendant Elsie 
H. Parry testified that Mr. Parry said to Mr. Millard: rrlf you 
continue to go on with the building, we will pay you the con-
tract price and also give you your ten percent" (R. 791). By 
way of conclusion upon leading questions from her counsel 
she said that extras were to be billed as separate items on a 
basis of cost plus 10% (R. 791). Neither of the defendants 
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testified to any st atement by Mr. Millard which would con-
stitute acceptance of any proposal which the Parrys now con-
strue to amount to a waiver of all of the benefits of architect 
supervision and a willingness to assume the additional costs 
incident to further owner supervision. The fact that Mrs. 
Parry said her husband mentioned, "If you continue on with 
the building" indicates that defendants recognized the fact 
he was released from his obligations to continue by terminating 
the services of the architect. 
Mr. Millard's statement that they only had a shell indi-
cated that the building was far from completion. Plaintiff's 
version of what Mr. Parry said is that Mr. Parry said he had 
taken over supervision, and that he would pay plaintiff his 
contractor's fees or percentage (R. 159-160). Furthermore, 
Mr. Parry did not contradict the testimony of Mr. Millard 
to the e:cfect when Mr. Parry abandoned the 6-unit apartment 
project, he promised plaintiff that he would get his contractor's 
percentage above costs (R. 190). Mr. Parry told the architect 
that he did not intend that Mr. Millard should be injured 
financially (R. 335-336). Mr. Parry told Mr. Millard to keep 
a record of all costs on the job, and such a statement was 
furnished Octozer 30, 1951, Exhibit P-8 (R. 161), and a final 
statement dated December 5, 1951, Exhibit P-9 was furnished. 
l\1r. Millard obtained the lien waivers as requested when 
payments were made (R. 776). Mr. Parry said that in a con-
versation with Mr. Millard about the middle of October, 1951, 
if Mr. Millard would furnish a list of people who had not 
been paid they would try and pay them, and try to settle this 
in the best manner they possibly could (R. 629). Such a state-
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ment made on the witness stand by Mr. Parry indicates that 
he recognized that it was a cost plus operation at that time. 
Finding of Fact No. 21 eroneously states that plaintiff 
did not furnish defendant Jesse H. Parry at any time a record 
of the amounts owing to materialmen and subcontractors (R. 
69). Plaintiff did not introduce proof of furnishing such in-
formation for the reason that it was expressly admitted by 
the defendant Jesse H. Parry: 
"This defendant admits that plaintiff furnished this 
defendant record of the amounts owing to material-
men and subcontractors, but denies he failed and neg-
lected to pay certain of said parties, and admits that 
he failed to pay the plaintiff ... "(R. 40). 
1-fr. Parry verified the claims of the various materialmen 
and subcontractors (R. 630). The Parrys not only received a 
statement as to total costs October 30, 1951, but thereafter 
they paid Ludlow Plumbing Company and other claimants. 
Finding of Fact No. 30 recites that the contract was in 
full force and effect at all times, and utterly disregards the 
conduct of the defendants, and the inducement for the con-
tract price, and holds that plaintiff is merely entitled to charge 
for changes and additional items as extras. As pointed out in 
discussion of Point 8, the court did not even allow recovery 
for the full amount of the costs plus 10% which the court 
found to be the agreement as to extras and changes. 
Point 8 
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW EVEN 
AS EXTRAS, THOUSANDS OF D01.LARS OF COSTS IN-
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CURRED BY PLAINTIFF THROUGH THE CONDUCT 
OF DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ARCHITECT, AMOUNTS 
TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF SAID DEFENDANTS. 
Even if it could be argued with any semblance of candor 
that there was still a written contract in existence after defend-
ant Jesse H. Parry terminated the services of the architect and 
took over complete supervision, the plaintiff would neverthe-
less be entitled to recover the amounts stated under Point 6, 
and plaintiff would also be entitled to recover his other costs 
occasioned by the errors and conduct of the architect and de-
fendants. 
It is significant that the court made findings to the effect 
that plaintiff should be compensated for additional work, 
changes and extras on the basis of cost plus 10%. (Findings 
of Fact No. 7, 10 (g), and 12). A finding of that character 
does not warrant scaling down recovery to a fraction of the 
costs actually incurred. There is no evidence in this case that 
plaintiff padded any costs. The defendants tried to minimize 
the importance of the changes and additional work involved. 
Their expert witness was not familiar in detail with all o£ 
the work done, and he based his figures not on actual cost 
incurred by plaintiff, but on the basis of what the cost might 
be if the items had originally been planned that way, although 
he limited his opinion to several items and omitted a substan-
tial part of them. 
The court not only denied plaintiff recovery for the sum 
of $3,212 as the amount plaintiff was induced to lower his 
bid on the promise of architect supervision and the assurance 
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of the award of construction of the 6 unit apartments, but the 
court denied plaintiff recovery of the items mentioned under 
Point 6 as additional costs incurred in excess of those on which 
the architect instructed the plaintiff to figure. The items here-
inafter mentioned are in addition to the items discussed under 
Point 6. The items on Exhibit 14 as items of expense to plain-
tiff are compared with the amounts actually allowed by the 
trial court: 
Item 
No. 
Nature of Additional 
Work Incurred 
47 Re-arranging cabinets and 
setting up additional cabi-
Cost Plus Am. Allowed 
10% By the Court 
nets purchased by owners ____ $ 532.40 $ 131.50 
49 Furring down kitchen ceil-
ings, enclosing runs thru-
out building, and install-
ing cold air returns under 
basement floor, labor 
$2,800, materials $660, 
overhead 10% 346 ________________ 4,186.60 998.25 
51 Moving back and forth, 
uncrating, locating, fitting, 
etc., 27 refrigerators, 
ranges ------------------------------------ 242.00 60.50 
60 Additoinal labor costs due 
to overtime, delays occa-
sioned by changes not 
otherwise shown as extras, 
and interference by owners ____ 2,662.00 363.00 
$7,62}.00 $1,603.25 
The court proceeded on the theory that it could determine 
"reasonable value" and therefore ignore actual costs incurred 
by plaintiff at the request of the architect and by defendants, or 
81 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
costs incurred by reason of the conduct of defendants. The 
finding of cost plus 10% is limited to items in addition to the 
contract price, whereas plaintiff contends that the finding 
should extend to total cost of construction. Nevertheless, the 
court did not adhere to its own finding, but attempted to scale 
down recovery to a portion of the actual costs incurred by 
plaintiff, on items on which the court found should be allow-
able as extras or additions. As pointed out by the Louisiana 
court in 1930, the owner is liable to the contractor for in-
creased cost of work due to changes necessitated by errors or 
omissions of the architect having supervision and drafting of 
plans. Bain v. l\1ann & Stern, 13·1 So. 492. See also Erskine 
r . .Johnson, 23 Neb. 261, 36 N.W. 510. 
In any event the trial court did not find any agreement 
to pay merely the "reasonable value" of work done in excess 
of the items covered, but on the basis of cost plus 10%, and 
the court did not follow its own interpretation of the agreement. 
Finding of Fact No. 10 is obviously erroneous in many 
particulars. Subdivision (e) which recites that defendants did 
not interfere with construction by entering into arguments with 
the architect, causing extensive delays, loss of effort and the 
payment of wages for employees of plaintiff without plaintiff 
obtaining value therefor, contradict the evidence. Subdivision 
(g) is also contrary to the record, for defendant Jesse H. Parry 
admitted that he ordered many changes (R. 632). Finding 
of Fact No. 11 is also contrary to the facts, for the Parrys did 
interfere and make construction more costly. The allowance 
of $363 for item 60 on Exhibit P-14 shows that the trial judge 
recognized the fact that owners did interfere and that they 
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did make construction more costly. In fact, Mr. Parry admitted 
that he had heated controversies with the architect, particularly 
over the heating (R. 716-717). He also said he had the right 
to make changes and that he did make changes, and then said 
he was willing to pay for them, too (R. 768, 771). However, 
his willingness to pay was limited to a very small fraction 
of the expense he caused plaintiff to incur. A classic example 
relates to item 51 involving the moving back and forth of 
refrigerators, uncrating them, locating and fitting them as 
well as ranges. Defendant professed to know of only one, 
and he wanted to allow $5 for "drayage" to compensate plain-
t.htf for $242 costs (R. 781) . The disposition of the defendants 
to ignore the costs, and to get the benefit without paying 
therefor is the whole cause of this lawsuit. 
As pointed out in 9 Am. Jur., p. 15, Sec. 19' "Where de-
fects in the plans and specifications, the sufficiency of which 
is not warranted by the contractor, necessitate extra work or 
materials to complete the contract, the contractor may recover 
therefor from the owner." Obviously, plaintiff did not agree 
to be responsible for the mistakes of either the architect or 
his principal, Mr. Parry. As shown above, the contractor was 
put to thousands of dollars in expense, and instead of allow-
ing plaintiff recovery for items which even the court found 
to be "extras" on the basis of cost plus 10%, the court allowed 
only a fraction of the cost and gave defendants Parry a "free 
ride for the balance." 
Mr. Clarence L. Merrill, now a general contractor, testified 
to the increased costs resulting from the changes. With re-
spect to each of the items he pointed out why the costs reached 
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the figures stated. Those reasons were not inefficiency on the 
part of plaintiff, but mistakes of the owners' architect, inter-
ference from the owners, and numerous changes on the part 
of the owners. He indicated that the cost of supervision by 
the owners, including over time amounting to approximately 
300 hours at the request of Mr. Parry in his effort to have the 
job completed expeditiously to get the apartments rented, re-
sulted in additional labor costs of $200 per unit for each of the 
11 units (R. 256-257, 288-289). Plaintiff is entitled to recover 
his total costs plus 10%, and he should not be limited to a token 
payment amounting to a small percentage of costs. 
This is not a case where controversy has arisen between 
the architect and the contractor as to interpretation of plans 
or specifications or the instructions to bidders. This case in-
volves controversies between the owner and the architect over 
the plans prepared by the architect and with respect to the 
corrections necessary to remedy defects. The mistakes are 
not chargeable to the contractor. He is the innocent victim. 
Part of the difficulty was the inability of the owners themselves 
to agree on what changes should be made and as to the method 
for making those changes. The trial court penalized the plain-
tiff for the mistakes of the architect, for the quarrels between 
the architect and the owners, and for the quarrels between the 
owners themselves, by disallowance of substantial part of 
the costs incurred by reason of the conduct of owners. 
Inasmuch as the defendants did not proceed with con-
struction of the 6-unit apartments, which promise was one 
of the chief inducements for reduction of the bid from $85,212 
to $82,000, when plaintiff was deprived of that construction, 
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if recission were not allowed, the plaintiff would be entitled 
to recover the sum of $3,212 by which he was induced to lower 
his bid. There is a plain case of unjust enrichment of defend-
ants, by disallowing plaintiff said sum, and also by disallowing 
him a substantial portion of the extra costs which he incurred 
on items for which the architect told him to make no allowance, 
and by virtue of the cast and omissions of defendants. These 
items are covered in part under Point 6 and in part under 
Point 8. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has not appealed from the portion of paragraph 
4 of the judgment and decree whereby the counterclaim of 
defendant Jesse H. Parry is dismissed, nor from paragraph 2 
of the judgment. Those parts not appealed from are correct. 
The other portions of the judgment are erroneous: (a) In 
awarding a money judgment to Jesse H. Parry, (b) in denying 
plaintiff interest on the sums impliedly found still due and 
owing at the time of trial, (c) in denying plaintiff attorney 
fees and costs, (d) in allowing defendants Parry recovery of 
their costs and interest and attorney fees paid after trial to 
the three claimants, (e) in limiting recovery of plaintiff to 
a mere fraction of his extra costs. 
Plaintiff claims the written contract was voidable by reason 
of having been induced by representations, instructions and 
promises which the defendants Parry failed to observe, whereby 
plaintiff was deprived of thousands of dollars in consideration 
for which he bargained in reducing his bid to $82,000. Plain-
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tiff contends that he is entitled to recover the further principal 
sum of $19,982.84 in excess of the principal sum of $3,950.69 
paid by defendants after the trial, because the understanding 
of the parties was that plaintiff was to be paid his total costs 
on the project plus 10%. 
The trial court found that the agreement to pay costs plus 
1 O% was limited to changes and extras. The court, however, 
did not adhere to its findings, and scaled down recovery to a 
mere fraction of plaintiff's costs for the items whiC::h the court 
found to be extras, and the court gave defendants credit for 
items which their architect instructed plaintiff to omit from 
his bid, and the court denied recovery of costs incurred in 
excess of the amounts which the architect instructed plaintiff 
to allow in making up his bid. The court disregarded for the 
most part the fact that the errors in the plans were c~argeable 
to defendants. The court also assumed that the contract required 
all items of construction to be performed by the general con-
tractor, contrary to the specific terms stated in the written 
instruments. The court likewise disregarded the fact that there 
was no dispute in the evidence as to the instructions given 
by the architect as to what items plaintiff should omit from 
his bid, and the specific allowances plaintiff should make for 
certain items. 
Even if it were held that plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
the entire principal balance of $19,984.84 over and above the 
amount allowed by the trial judge, as indicated in the discussion 
of Point 6 plaintiff was entitled to recover an additional amount 
of $5, 759.35, and as illustrated under Point 8 the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover an additional sum of $6,019.75 as the 
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net amount of costs for changes anq extras disallowed by the 
court in the scaling down process, and also the further sum 
of $3,212.00 by which plaintiff was induced to reduce his bid on 
promises which were never kept, which sums aggregate $14,-
991.10 in addition to the small amount of $3,803.17 impliedly 
found due and owing at the time of trial. 
The plaintiff is also entitled to interest from November 9, 
1951, on all sums due and owing which were unpaid at the 
time of trial, the trial court being in error in denying plaintiff 
interest. The plaintiff is also entitled to recover his costs and 
the statutory attorney fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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